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Getting to Work on Time: 
A Proposed Time-Equitable Tolling Scheme 
Dynamic tolls present an opportunity for municipalities to eliminate congested 
roadways and fund infrastructure. Known variously as congestion pricing or value pricing 
and implemented through dynamically priced toll lanes and cordon charges, planners 
have tried to create free flowing conditions by charging higher prices for travelers who 
wish to travel in the middle of the peak period. Because these tolls vary in response to 
demand, travelers are forced to more explicitly consider the cost of travel and so may 
choose to forgo it entirely or to shift the time of travel for trips that are less important. 
The imposition of tolls that regulate travel along a public highway through the use 
of a monetary fee raises worries of inequity. This thesis is thematically divided into two 
projects. The first is a qualitative investigation into equity. The objective of this 
discussion is to provide a framework for why we value equity in order to explain whether 
new policies (without established legal guidance) are inequitable. This explicitly 
normative discussion draws on work by the philosopher John Rawls to argue that equity 
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concerns in transportation are primarily rooted in a desire to respect all travelers equally 
and that time poverty ought to be considered in policy-making in the same ways that 
income poverty already is. I then argue that tolling schemes (by which I mean any 
structured description of a time-varying toll) that produce time-poverty among poorer 
travelers ought to be examined as a potential equity concern.  
The second project is the application of the qualitative equity investigation to a 
particular implementation of a time-varying toll in the Vickrey bottleneck model to 
examine whether it raises equity concerns. To achieve this end, I selected an analytically 
tractable example of the Vickrey bottleneck that eliminates congestion through targeting 
each traveler’s value of time. I compare and contrast the cost burdens of a no-toll, system 
optimal toll, and what I will call a “time-equitable” toll on homogeneous and 
heterogeneous traveler groups. I will show that the time-equitable toll is able to eliminate 
congestion while creating equitable travel patterns amongst traveler groups. 
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“Transportation doesn’t hire you. But it makes getting to work possible. 
It doesn’t treat illness, but it makes getting healthcare possible. 
It doesn’t teach, but it makes learning possible. 
It’s not a house, but try getting to yours without it.” 
 
Anthony Foxx, U.S. Secretary of Transportation 
Address to the 2016 Transportation Research Board 
(Foxx, 2016) 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The US road network is not overwhelmed because too many people want to 
travel. It is overwhelmed because too many people want to travel at the same time. The 
congestion that arises from too many travelers using the same roads to reach similar 
destinations within a constrained time period, e.g. morning rush hour, imposes severe 
costs on all commuters. As roads become more congested, the marginal congestion 
created by an additional vehicle increases and is primarily experienced by other drivers 
(rather than the individual joining the corridor). In 2014, the Texas Transportation 
Institute estimated that congestion delayed American travelers by 6.9 billion hours, 
wasted 3.1 billion gallons of fuel, and cost the country $160 billion – $960 per auto 
commuter (Schrank, Eisele, Lomax, & Bak, 2015). Declining receipts from traditional 
funding sources have restricted the growth and rehabilitation of infrastructure and so 
transportation planners and engineers are increasingly turning to innovative approaches in 
order to control congestion and raise revenues. 
An increasingly popular option being considered around the world is to charge 
commuters for traveling at peak periods. Known variously as congestion pricing or value 
pricing and implemented through dynamically priced toll lanes and cordon charges, 
planners have tried to create free flowing conditions by charging higher prices for 
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travelers who wish to travel in the middle of the peak period. Because these tolls vary in 
response to demand, travelers are forced to more explicitly consider the cost of travel and 
so may choose to forgo it entirely or to shift the time of travel for trips that are less 
important. Although most implementations of these tolling schemes are solely interested 
in their ability to efficiently raise revenue to pay for infrastructure, congestion relief has 
been an enduring theme of the time-varying toll literature. 
The imposition of tolls that regulate travel along a public highway through the use 
of a monetary fee intuitively raises worries of inequity. The policy and theoretical 
background of equity will be discussed in later sections, but for now it is enough to note 
that it seems likely that predicating access to roads at peak periods on one’s ability to pay 
will decrease the likelihood that poorer travelers will choose to travel at peak periods. If 
nondiscriminatory access to public roads is a public good, then this observation is a prima 
facie, though defeasible, case against such policies. In particular, research on time 
poverty by sociologists raises worries that there are significant harms to low-income 
travelers associated with being segregated to off peak travel over and above any concerns 
raised about the monetary costs of the tolls. 
This thesis is thematically divided into two projects, and hence has two 
argumentative chapters. The first project, contained in Chapter 2, is a qualitative 
investigation into equity. The objective of this discussion is to provide a framework for 
why we value equity in order to explain whether new policies (without established legal 
guidance) are inequitable. This explicitly normative discussion draws on work by the 
philosopher John Rawls to argue that equity concerns in transportation are primarily 
rooted in a desire to respect all travelers equally and that time poverty ought to be 
considered in policy-making in the same ways that income poverty already is. I then 
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argue that tolling schemes (by which I mean any structured description of a time-varying 
toll) that produce time-poverty among poorer travelers ought to be examined as a 
potential equity concern.  
The second project, found in Chapter 3, is the application of the qualitative equity 
investigation to a particular implementation of a time-varying toll to examine whether it 
raises equity concerns. To achieve this end, I selected an analytically tractable example of 
the Vickrey bottleneck that eliminates congestion through targeting each traveler’s value 
of time. I compare and contrast the cost burdens of a no-toll, system optimal toll, and 
what I will call a “time-equitable” toll on homogeneous and heterogeneous traveler 
groups. I will show that the time-equitable is able to eliminate congestion while creating 
equitable travel patterns amongst traveler groups. 
As will become clear in Chapter 3, the dynamic tolling scheme derived from the 
Vickrey bottleneck is highly constrained by the assumptions governing traveler 
preferences and the complete knowledge of preferences of all travelers by both the toll 
agency and the individual travelers. I nonetheless believe there is significant value to be 
gained from working closely with this deliberately constrained model for three reasons. 
First, its deterministic view of traveler behavior and preferences allows for the 
formulation of closed form solutions and simple replication of results. Second, a tolling 
scheme is an expression of values. Whether a tolling scheme is optimized to reduce 
congestion, pollution, or traveling costs for the poor it expresses a value judgment for 
how the goods of travel should be allocated and who should bear the costs. Using a 
deliberately simple traveler model allows us to bring this value judgment to the fore and 
to better understand how the results are affected by changes in the parameters. I hope that 
this thesis will help to spark a debate on what objectives we should prioritize in a tolling 
4 
 
scheme that can then later inform empirical research into how those objectives may be 
fulfilled. Third, big data analytical techniques bring us ever closer to a world where the 
full information assumptions are actually realized. It will be possible to micro-target 
individuals to gain a fine-grained estimate of their willingness to pay and so we should 
have an informed debate over tolling policy objectives before these schemes are 
implemented by industry. 
1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF TOLL ROADS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Congestion tolls represent a significant change in the way we determine access to 
public roads. Beginning in 1795 with the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike and 
continuing to today, almost all roads in the United States are either free or require the 
payment of a fixed toll. There are 6,088 miles of toll roads in the United States (Federal 
Highway Administration Office of Highway Policy Information, 2016) that are tolled for 
three main reasons (Giuliano, 1992). The first kind of toll is the fee charged to cross a 
bridge or travel along a road that is intended only to recoup the costs of construction and 
maintenance. The Golden Gate Bridge, Brooklyn Bridge and roads like State Route 400 
in Georgia and the Pennsylvania Turnpike were originally tolled only to pay back 
construction costs though tolls were continued to pay for maintenance or the construction 
of other road facilities. The tolls along these routes are insensitive to demand; they were 
not optimized to achieve either profit maximization or congestion relief. A second kind of 
toll, the cordon toll, is designed to either decrease emissions, raise revenue, or to 
generally discourage traffic through a fixed rate that is not sensitive to real time 
information about network congestion. Although New York City considered and rejected 
a cordon toll, current implementations of this kind of toll are found around the world, in 
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Milan’s Area C, London, and Singapore (FHWA, 2008). Finally, there are dynamically 
priced tolls that explicitly respond to changes in demand either to maximize profits, or to 
minimize congestion, or both. The LBJ TEXpress Lanes in Dallas, TX and Interstate 
Highway 495 in Washington, D.C. are both examples of this this latter structure. 
1.2 A SURVEY OF CURRENT TOLL ROAD RESEARCH 
Contemporary research on the dynamic pricing of toll roads has largely been 
concentrated on their ability to effectively relieve congestion, improve environmental 
pollution measures, and maximize profits for the road operator. Results have been 
dramatic even when toll rates are static. Cordon tolls in Sweden that increase over the 
course of the peak period have reduced congestion by 22% and enjoy widespread public 
support (Sørensen, Isaksson, Macmillen, Åkerman, & Kressler, 2014). A survey of 
European congestion tolls saw 14%-23% decreases in vehicle counts in Milan and 
Bologna (respectively); 30% and 33% decreases in delay times in London and 
Stockholm; CO2 emissions were cut by 13% in Stockholm and 21% in Rome; and 
collision rates in Milan (the only city in the study to properly track accident rates) 
declined by 14% (May, Koh, Blackledge, Humphrey, & Fioretto, 2009). These effects are 
predictable and reproducible across a wide variety of contexts, because consumer 
elasticity towards tolls has been found to stably vary between -0.2 and -0.8 across a wide 
variety of research (Wuesterfeld & Regan, 1981; White, 1984; Ribas, Raymond, & 
Matas, 1988; Jones & Hervik, 1992; Hirschman, Mcknight, Pucher, Paaswell, & 




 The effectiveness of tolls at reducing congestion has led to research in a number 
of new areas, including setting optimal tolls to maximize revenue (Verhoef, Nijkamp, & 
Rietveld, 1996; Joksimovic, Bliemer, & Bovy, 2005; Bertsimas & Perakis, 2006), relieve 
congestion at minimal cost (Dial, 1999; de Palma, Kilani, & Lindsey, 2005), or reduce 
emissions (Harrington, Krupnick, & Alberini, 2001; Hensher, 2008; Rotaris, Danielis, 
Marcucci, & Massiani, 2010). Some authors have even introduced equitable tolling 
requirements as a constraint in the bi-level network optimization problem (Paleti, He, & 
Peeta, 2016). 
Real world practitioners are keenly aware of the equity pitfalls congestion tolls 
present. Public support for value pricing in a number of projects has been highly 
responsive to the claim that the toll roads benefit wealthy travelers at the expense of the 
poor. The popular moniker “Lexus Lanes” for high occupancy toll lanes bears witness to 
this fact. Adequately addressing equity concerns has propelled the success of a number of 
projects while ignoring equity has led to significant public protest (Weinstein & Sciara, 
2006). For the most part though the consensus seems to be that equity concerns are a 
purely public relations (Wang, Yang, Zhu, & Li, 2012) or education (Giuliano, 1992) 
problem. Giuliano found that much of the opposition to value pricing results from public 
focus on the immediate user cost of a toll rather than its effects on delay or travel times 
across the system, skepticism that the toll would be set at an optimal rate, a conviction 
that tolls would lead to significant spillover onto no-toll local links, and a belief that 
funds collected would not be used to improve the network. If users could only understand 
the way tolls would be determined, she argues, their opposition would disappear.  
Authors who see resistance to congestion tolls from equity concerns as purely a 
messaging problem have tended to recommend that the problem be managed by 
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allocating toll revenues to projects that visibly increase equity. These authors argue that 
tolls lack a natural constituency. Every individual traveler feels the cost when they must 
pay as they travel but the benefits of lower congestion are hard to see and so there are no 
champions willing to bear a political price for the toll. One proposed solution to solve this 
problem is to ensure that funds collected by road tolls are then used to build other new 
infrastructure. Public support tends to be greater if funds are used for similar projects 
rather than assigned to a general fund with no intuitive relationship to the source of 
funding (Gomez-Ibanez, 1992). Researchers have also found that public support is 
greater if the funds are used on new infrastructure along the tolled corridor (Bay Area 
Economic Forum, 1990). Burtraw (1991) suggests that the most equitable, and also 
politically viable solution, is to link funding for indirect, non-monetary compensation to 
the harms of a policy decision. Improving the road network around busy exit ramps, 
installing sound walls, or even building parks and open spaces help local communities to 
feel that their concerns are valued by decision makers and can blunt opposition to tolling 
plans that seem to harm residents for the benefit of other travelers. Others have proposed 
that revenues (rather than physical improvements) ought to be assigned to local 
municipalities along the route of the toll road (King, Manville, & Shoup, 2007). Although 
the tolls may end up in a general fund, these authors argue that it is more equitable for 
regional travelers to pay for the cost of the infrastructure through a toll than for local 
residents to pay for it through property or sales taxes when they may rarely use the road. 
As a side benefit, making toll revenues a reliable funding stream may also convert many 
cash-strapped cities into motivated advocates. 
A second popular option to increase support and assuage worries over equity, 
which could be seen as a variant of the first, is to use the revenues for public transit 
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(Small, 1992). The toll revenues are used to directly make the poorest travelers better off 
by improving service connections and transportation options that will further improve 
congestion. Transit funding can be a powerful tool to promote equity because it improves 
travel opportunities both for travelers with vehicles as well as those without. One might 
compare this to funding for sidewalks and curb cuts which are absolutely vital for some 
travelers but assist every member of the community. A third suggestion that addresses 
equity as a public relations problem is that revenues be evenly distributed amongst 
travelers as a substitution for gasoline or other sales taxes (Small, 1992). This option 
lacks the clear benefit to a core constituency that could cheerlead the measure, but it also 




Chapter 2: Equity 
Given the complexities of real world policies, their unpredictable interactions, and 
the way support for policies in one arena motivate our preferences in others, judgments 
about the fairness of a particular policy are often unclear and uncertain. Nonetheless, the 
goal of creating and administering fair policies is deeply rooted in the political culture of 
the United States. The most common way this concern is articulated in policy is as a 
concern for equity. Fairness, and by extension equity, are fuzzy concepts. Much like 
Justice Potter Stewart’s famous dictum “I know it when I see it” to define whether a film 
was an example of pornography1 or an inability to come up with a clear, concise 
definition of music that captures the concept fully (Kania, 2011; Godt, 2005; Nettl, 
1977), political concepts are often the subject of intense debate. These definitions can be 
central to our political understanding and so are contentious. In order to facilitate this 
debate and avoid just building my preferred theory into the definition of equity, let us 
begin with a highly general and widely accepted definition and proceed to refine the 
concept from there. I will expand on this concept as the argument develops, but let us 
begin with a tentative description that an equitable policy is one that fairly allocates its 
costs and benefits (Litman, 2016). Then, once this definition is settled, we will ask 
whether time is the kind of good that raises equity concerns. 
There is a widespread demand for equitable policies in a wide variety of public 
services. In transportation, equity is implicated in decisions regarding the provision of 
                                                 
1 Nico Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184 (1964) 
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facilities and services, usage charges and regulations for same, quality and frequency of 
transit services, mitigation and compensation for externalities and other negative impacts, 
and enforcement efforts related to transportation facilities and services. Take, for 
instance, a municipal bus service. The best strategy for creating a profitable bus authority 
may involve buying new touring buses with built-in Wi-Fi and other amenities for rapid 
commuter routes serving wealthier travelers (in order to increase the attractiveness of 
transit in relation to driving alone) while shunting older buses to lines serving poorer 
neighborhoods (where ridership is less elastic since other modes are cost prohibitive). 
Such a strategy strikes many people as unfair, because conveys the judgment that the 
comfort of some riders as worthy of more concern by the authority. These same concerns 
arise in non-transportation services as well. One of the most damning criticisms of ‘stop 
and frisk’ policing strategies is that they expose innocents in a minority group to 
significantly more state intrusion based on nothing other than their inclusion in the group 
(Maynard-Moody & Mushenso, 2012; Glaser, 2005; Brown Jr., 2013). Although there 
may be some benefit to targeting a group (the evidence is at best mixed), singling people 
out for immutable characteristics violates norms that police must have specific evidence 
of wrongdoing to rightfully detain persons. 
Todd Litman, executive director of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute, argues 
that there are three diverse (and sometimes conflicting) conceptions of equity in the 
transportation sector: horizontal equity, vertical equity with regard to income and social 
class, and vertical equity with regard to mobility need and ability (Litman, 2016). 
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1) Horizontal equity 
A policy exhibits horizontal equity when its costs and benefits are 
distributed strictly by cost or need. The goal is perfectly equal treatment; 
individuals subject to the policy should receive equal benefits, pay equal 
costs, and be treated in a procedurally identical manner. When allocations 
of goods are determined by payments, everyone should “get what they pay 
for and pay for what they get.” Horizontally equitable policies include the 
triage system of determining the order patients are seen at an emergency 
room, the allocation of one person one vote, and movements to ensure that 
local property taxes ought to be spent on local projects. 
2) Vertical equity with regard to demography or income 
Vertically equitable policies distribute their costs and benefits with a 
sensitivity to the distribution of impacts between groups that differ with 
respect to income, social class, race, or some other identifiable distinction. 
Transport policies may be vertically equitable if they favor disadvantaged 
groups in a manner that compensates for structural inequalities in the 
larger society (Rawls, 1999). Policies that favor disadvantaged groups and 
remove inequalities can be termed progressive, and policies that disfavor 
or exacerbate inequalities may be called regressive. Vertically equitable 
transit policies may call for higher levels of service to poorer 
12 
 
neighborhoods in recognition of the fact that many residents lack 
alternative transport modes.   
3) Vertical equity with regard to mobility need and ability 
A second variety of vertically equitable policies is focused on the different 
ways differing mobility needs and abilities change access to social goods. 
Policies under this aspect of equity include universal design, e.g. curb cuts 
for wheelchairs, audible beacons for crosswalks, or wheelchair ramps on 
kneeling buses. The central point here is that urban design geared solely 
for persons without disabilities would render the city inaccessible to 
persons with mobility related disabilities and so the equitable response is 
to design all infrastructure to be compatible with as wide a variety of 
travelers as is feasible. 
Other forms of equity have been discussed in the literature, including geographic 
equity (i.e. services and social goods available to citizens living in different regions), 
modal equity (i.e. the attractiveness of transit services vs. drive alone), industry (e.g. 
heavy manufacturing may be the lifeblood of a region’s economy and so the trucking 
industry may be taxed in a way that avoids paying the full cost of the damage their trucks 
do to the road network), or trip type (e.g. a transit agency may focus on providing access 
or fare subsidies to medical facilities, schools, and grocery stores, but not to theme parks 
or the nightlife district) but these have limited application to our current questions 
(Ungemah, 2007). With respect to variable road tolling schemes, we are most concerned 
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with whether such a scheme ought to be implemented in a horizontally equitable manner 
(i.e. the only determinant of access is one’s willingness and ability to pay the toll) or 
whether there are identifiable socioeconomic groups that, for a reason we will need to 
articulate, ought to receive a subsidy on their travel relative to the general public. While 
there are many interesting research questions into how we might devise a tolling scheme 
that addresses Litman’s third kind of equity or even racial inequities, I will put them to 
the side in this thesis because the parameters of the Vickrey bottleneck are most clearly 
applied to income and socio-economic status.2 
Let us set aside the question of whether a subsidy is appropriate in the time-
varying toll case identified by the thesis for the moment in order to briefly explore the 
general evaluation of a vertically equitable transportation policy. The policy debate 
begins with an assumption that a horizontally equitable policy is correct. In the absence 
of compelling evidence, citizens are to be treated in a facially equal manner. The onus is 
on anyone who proposes a subsidy to achieve vertical equity. If a subsidy is appropriate, 
then it is appropriate because 1) there is some difference in the travel behavior of persons 
in different classes and 2) there is some moral, political, or legal significance in that 
difference which calls for state intervention.3 
                                                 
2 However, I would direct the interested reader to papers which examine this category of equity as a 
variation of the network design problem with equity constraints. Ferguson et al. (2012) incorporates equity 
into a solution of the transit frequency-setting problem. Duthie and Waller (2008) examines a solution to 
the bi-level network design problem that adopts equity as part of the objective function. And Boyles (2015) 
looks at the problem of distributing funding for roadway maintenance in a geographically equitable 
manner. 
3 Ideally political and legal motivations for equity interventions will be grounded in a moral theory which 
justifies them, but that will not always be the case. 
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To identify a disparity, planners decide on the relevant analysis group, and then 
decide whether they will examine travel statistics, costs imposed, or both. So, for 
instance, if a planner allocating funds for safety improvements is interested in whether 
minority neighborhoods are receiving an equitable investment, they may be interested in 
whether the pedestrian accident rates are significantly higher in traffic analysis zones 
(TAZs) with higher minority populations than elsewhere in the city. Or, if a planner is 
considering a city transit subsidy for low-income households, they may examine whether 
those households have significantly fewer total trips, experience longer travel times or 
delays, and trip elasticity to user fee changes. If a gap is found and a small decrease in 
fare prices for low-income would bring minority trips in line with the rest of the city, then 
the subsidy may be adopted. The exact features that must be examined will be unique to 
the population being considered and the proposed remedy, but Table 1 contains some of 
the most common analysis units. They can be mixed, matched, and combined as needed 









Table 1: Examples of measures of effectiveness for evaluating equity policies in 
transportation. 
Unit Size  Travel Units Costs 
# of Persons in HH VMT Tax Rates 
# of Adults in HH PMT User Fees 
# of Commuters in 
HH 
# of Trips Direct and Indirect  
Traffic Analysis Zone Trip Travel Time Subsidies 
 Minutes of Delay Measured Pollutants 
 Accessibility Indices Accident Rates 
  Gini Coefficient4 
 
This process has been formalized by Ng (2005) into a five-step process for evaluating the 
equity of a policy. 
1) Identify disadvantaged demographic groups. 
2) Identify disadvantaged geographic areas using census data. 
3) Identify degrees of disadvantage. (Ng suggests using five degrees of 
disadvantage. This allows the population to be meaningfully separated, but 
prevents segregation into so many groups that no effective policy can be 
formulated.) 
4) Identify locations of important public services and destinations. 
5) Evaluate transportation plans by their effect on disadvantaged 
communities. 
                                                 
4 The Gini coefficient measures the inequality of the distribution of wealth or income in a country by 
examining its concentration. A country where everyone has the same wealth or income would have a Gini 
coefficient of 0, while a society where one person owns all of the wealth and everyone else has nothing 
would have a Gini coefficient of nearly 1. Amartya Sen (1977) has an enlightening discussion on the use of 
Gini coefficients to measure poverty and inequality. 
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2.1 THE POLICY FOUNDATIONS OF EQUITY IN THE US LEGAL CODE 
The discussion in this thesis is framed around two normative questions: is equity a 
value that should be pursued in our public policy and, if so, how should it be best 
achieved with respect to time-varying tolls? It is important to note, though, that equity 
considerations are not merely philosophical. Consideration of equity and the 
distributional effects of transportation projects is enshrined in United States law and by 
presidential executive orders. The most important legal protections come from Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000d et seq.), which generally prohibits 
discrimination in federal programs: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.” This broad statement on discrimination was extended to programs 
receiving funding from the US Department of Transportation by regulations in the 
FHWA (23 CFR part 200) and FTA (49 CFR part 21).  
Legal protections against discrimination in transportation funding are also found 
in: 
1) Section 109 (h) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 (23 USC 109), 
which requires projects to be approved “in the best overall public interest” 
and that effort should be made to eliminate or minimize the effect on 
community cohesion, employment, and the displacement of people;  
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2) Section 162 (a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 (23 USC 324), 
which addresses discrimination based on sex; 
3) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC § 701 et seq.), 
which addresses disability discrimination;  
4) The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (29 USC §6101); 
5) The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which identified the extent to 
which Title VI applied to include all federal-aid recipients, sub-recipients, 
and contractors, rather than only when the specific activity receives 
federal funding; 
6) The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 USC § 12101 et seq.).  
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 USC 4321-4347)5 required 
that proposed major transportation facilities receive an analysis of environmental impacts 
that went beyond the infrastructure itself to include a broader geographic area, where the 
environment included both the physical landscape as well as the communities potentially 
affected by the facility. This helps to explain why President Clinton’s Executive Orders 
on equity in transportation use the term “environmental justice” instead of equity. 
Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629), Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice 
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, directs that “each Federal agency 
shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and 
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or 
                                                 
5 And updates to the law: Public Law 91-190 (1970), Public Law 94-52 (1975), Public Law 94-83 (1975), 
and Public Law 97-258 (1982). 
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environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and 
low-income populations.” We see here that, although the language is slightly different, 
the spirit of equity, i.e. that the differential effects of policies upon groups should be 
minimized, is at the heart of the order. Updates to the Executive Order further require that 
the U.S. DOT ensure the full, fair, and meaningful participation of potentially affected 
communities and that it prevent the denial of, reduction in, or significant delay in the 
receipt of benefits by minority and low-income populations (FHWA, 2015). Building on 
this legacy, the U.S. DOT has issued a number of important orders and regulations that 
continue to demonstrate the Federal government’s interest in creating an equitable 
transportation system. 
2.2 GROUNDING EQUITY IN CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEORIES 
Concern for equitable policies is enshrined in US law and is an accepted part of 
transportation planning. However, this background state of affairs does not determine the 
question of whether a time-varying toll in particular creates an equity concern. The 
effects of time-varying tolls are unclear prior to an investigation, but we can sketch out 
the conditions under which a toll scheme might prompt equity concerns. The argument 
that a toll scheme raises equity concerns has two parts. 
First, I propose a moral judgment that grounds our beliefs about equity. Our 
concern for equity is rooted in a desire to show equal respect for all persons. The desire to 
show equal respect for all persons is more fundamental than judgments about specific 
policies and can serve as a guide to help us form judgments in new, difficult, or 
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contentious cases.6 Second, given that a policy which does not show equal respect for 
persons is inequitable, I will argue that a tolling scheme which prioritizes travelers solely 
by the absolute amount they are able to pay shows insufficient respect for poorer 
travelers. Low-income households already face significant burdens in managing their 
time and shifting these travelers to the margins of the peak period (even if 
unintentionally) will create more strain on their ability to lead their lives. The next step of 
showing that a particular toll scheme in the Vickrey bottleneck model shows insufficient 
respect for the time of poorer travelers is a major argument of the next chapter. 
This thesis is an inappropriate forum to describe all of the debates that have taken 
place in the philosophical literature regarding equity and justice, but I believe a brief 
description of work by John Rawls, a central author in the egalitarian justice literature, 
can shed light on the issue without requiring an extended foray into the minutiae of the 
particular debates. His argument provides compelling reasons that we should care about 
equity and we will see that respect for persons plays an outsized role in explaining its 
importance. 
Rawls’ primary project is to understand the question: what are fair terms of social 
cooperation for free and equal citizens? Rawls’ answer ran through a thought experiment 
that he termed the Original Position. The Original Position provides some guidelines to 
help us reach generally acceptable terms of cooperation by asking us to abstract away 
                                                 
6 The method here is akin to a case where a biologist wants to know whether a new specimen qualifies as a 
member of a species. There are certain features that members of the species possess and checking the 
features helps to guide the biologist’s considered judgment of whether she has a new species. So too, when 
we want to know if a policy is fair or equitable, we must first know the moral features that make any policy 
in general equitable and can then move on to judge the particular case. 
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from many of the things that we know about ourselves (that might tempt us to set the 
rules of cooperation in ways that favor us) and to focus on creating a society that would 
be acceptable to all rational persons. 
To understand the Original Position, picture ourselves as policy makers interested 
in constructing a just state from the ground up (and who eventually will be interested in 
devising a just time-varying tolling scheme). There are no laws, no distributions of rights 
or resources, and no political or social structure. We begin legislating ab nihilo. That is, 
imagine that we have gathered to legislate in complete ignorance of our own physical and 
mental characteristics. We don’t know our gender, race, sexual orientation, or age.  We 
are ignorant of our mental and physical strengths, limitations, and infirmities. We do 
know that the citizens of our society will have diverse beliefs about the best way to live 
their lives and that these plans will require economic goods. We know that our society is 
constrained by a moderate scarcity where there are not enough resources for everyone to 
get everything they want. And we also know general facts about human social life, 
including uncontroversial conclusions of science and human social life.7   
With this limited knowledge about ourselves and humankind, we are in a position 
to answer Rawls’ question. Because we do not have any information in the Original 
Position that would allow us to govern society in our favor, the terms of cooperation we 
devise will be fair. With our limited knowledge, if we choose rules that permit unlimited 
                                                 
7 Rawls’ project is to understand the terms of cooperation that would be reached by human citizens, and this 
would be impossible if, for instance, the Original Position hid from us the reality that human beings will 
starve to death without food or that human beings generally form bonds of attachment to their offspring.  
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accumulation of capital into the hands of, say, the top 1% of IQ test scorers and 
disenfranchise the remaining 99%, then we would have to accept that we would have a 
99% chance of having no future voice in the direction of our society. If we choose rules 
that permit racial slavery, subjugation of a sex, or other discriminatory policies, then we 
do so with the risk that we might end up on the short end of the stick.  
Rawls uses the Original Position as a heuristic to help us understand what rules 
we would be rational to endorse, and is under no illusion that we could undergo such a 
debate or create such a consensus. (After all, the first step is to abstract away from all of 
the unique characteristics that make us who we are and inform our views about the good 
life.) Under such uncertainty, Rawls argues that a rational deliberative body just 
described will choose basic principles of justice that will ensure, whatever role those 
legislators eventually have in society, that they will be able to participate in society and 
that their economic and social circumstances will not fall below a minimum floor. These 
conclusions are formally stated as the Equal Liberty Principle and the Difference 
Principle (Rawls, 2001). 
• Equal Liberty Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to 
a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties and this scheme is 
compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all;  




a. They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; 
b. They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members 
of society.8 
Rawls’ first principle enshrines a respect for both de jure and de facto equality 
(not equity) of political power and participation. Citizens would be guaranteed the basic 
rights that have long been a part of the Western liberal tradition: freedom of association, 
speech, and religious belief, the right to vote, hold public office, and the be treated 
equally by the rule of law. These rights are inalienable by the citizens.  
The difference principle arises from two arguments. First, as legislators in the 
Original Position who have no knowledge of the resources or talents that we will possess 
once our social rules are realized, we will create conservative rules for the distribution of 
certain social and economic goods.9 If we have an equal chance of receiving any of the 
specified amounts of resources, then we will choose to minimize our risk of losing out by 
allocating equal shares to each person in society. The idea that everyone would be so risk 
averse that rationality itself demands an equal partitioning of social goods has been 
                                                 
8 Different social roles and occupations may generate inequalities. For instance, it might (and I emphasize 
might because the details would be crucial) be permissible for doctors to earn more than manual laborers 
because the work they do helps the least well off and their income may be necessary to incentivize enough 
people to spend years mastering an incredibly difficult craft. This should help alleviate concerns that 
differences are permissible because of desert; people who take those risks will deserve the rewards they 
receive, but it will also be true that the least advantaged will not be undeservingly confined to that position. 
9 Note that these primary social goods are broadly construed – “These goods normally have a use whatever 
a person's rational plan of life. For simplicity, assume that the chief primary goods at the disposition of 
society are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth” – and stand in contrast to 
what Rawls calls primary natural goods, e.g. health and vigor, intelligence and imagination, which are 
certainly important to a happy life but cannot be directly controlled by a social structure (Rawls, 1999). 
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extensively criticized10, but it seems plausible that persons truly ignorant of their station 
in life would be highly concerned with maximizing their well-being in their worst-case 
scenario.  
A second, better, argument to motivate this position is that the social class into 
which a citizen is born and the resources that their parents have to raise them are morally 
arbitrary facts. Individuals have no control over or responsibility for their parents and so 
there could be no sense in which a particular individual deserves the advantages or 
disadvantages that they may experience as a result of their innate intelligence, the wealth 
of parents, or the stability and prosperity of the country in which they are born. And, 
because we do not morally deserve to receive more or less than other people at the 
moment of our birth, there is at least a prima facie reason for society to be structured so 
that everyone has an equal share of economic resources. 
However, a society where everyone lacks access to food could still be equal and 
allowing for some limited inequalities with respect to wealth and resources may 
incentivize citizens to take risks or to invest in education that may be difficult and take a 
long time to pay off. Therefore, Rawls allows, the rational legislators in the Original 
Position may permit those inequalities that improve the situation of the worst-off citizens. 
Since the legislators are in complete ignorance of their station in society, they will 
consent to rules that make their worst-case scenario as bearable as possible. 
                                                 
10 Cf. Harsanyi (1975). 
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There are again a number of caveats that should be expressed, most notably that 
Rawls denies that the legislators might be willing to make everyone worse off as a result 
of envy for the highest earners, but let us set those specifics to the side.11 Furthermore, 
we should be clear that Rawls does not endorse using his theory of justice to judge 
particular applications of policy. It is not a theory designed to help pass judgement on a 
law or administrative rule because he intended to discuss how the entire structure of 
society ought to be organized. So, we should resist any easy attempt to pass judgment on 
a particular tolling policy by subjecting it to a direct test of the difference principle. 
However, it is appropriate to use Rawls’ thought experiment of the legislators in the 
original position to understand the contours and demands of a large social goal, e.g. 
equity.  
The thought experiment of the Original Position can help us to explain our 
interest in equity and the reason why it has even been enshrined in US law. After all, 
equity may require large sacrifices and make markets less efficient, so it is rather 
remarkable that it has such widespread support. Rawls’ equal liberty principle is derived 
from the belief that all citizens are fundamentally equal and so deserve to be shown equal 
respect by the state. As legislators, we would not accept policies that exclude us from the 
goods of social cooperation. Furthermore, those inequalities that we might accept out of 
the Original Position will be tied to making everyone better off. 
                                                 
11 Rawls’ theory of justice has inspired a large and varied literature. A small sampling of this further 
discussion can be found in Rawls (1999; 2001; 2005), Sandel (1998) and Sen (2009). 
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Equity is and ought to be a social policy priority precisely because being shown 
sufficient respect by society and the state is a central human good. By engaging in Rawls’ 
exercise, we come to understand that one reason to endorse equity is that many of the 
economic differences we encounter in society are morally arbitrary. We endorse policies 
geared to ensure equity or to rectify inequalities because we reflectively endorse policies 
that minimize economic and social marginalization due to morally arbitrary factors. This 
discussion provides us with something like a litmus test to evaluate potential policies. 
When we consider a potential policy, we can ask of it: “Does this policy show equal 
respect to all citizens?” We now have a theoretical grounding for Litman’s distinctions 
amongst various kinds of equity. In cases where horizontal equity is the primary social 
good, this is because we judge that the citizens are on an equal playing field and so we 
show them equal respect by treating everyone in the same manner. In cases where 
vertical equity is important, this is because we judge that citizens are not on an equal 
playing field and so we show them equal respect by ensuring that the least advantaged 
receive compensatory benefits that allow them to access or compete for social and 
economic goods from which they would otherwise be shut out. 
2.3 HISTORIC EQUITY CONCERNS AND TOLL ROADS 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the allocation of the primary social goods is 
determined by adherence to Rawls’ Equal Liberty Principle and Difference Principle. 
Access to the transportation system is clearly one of those goods for two reasons. First, 
the transportation system plays such a central role in the lives of all citizens that it is 
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foundational to the pursuit of virtually any conception of a good life. And second, the 
transportation system requires such large up-front capital investments that monopolies are 
likely to develop and so citizens deserve a voice in the governance of those systems. 
 Anthony Foxx’s 2016 address to the Transportation Research Board in 
Washington, DC, which prefaces this thesis, makes precisely this point. The US economy 
is growing ever more complex and citizens rely upon the transportation network to 
connect them to their jobs, to food, to healthcare, and to their friends and family. If 
citizens are isolated from the transportation network, they would be unable to pursue 
many of the activities that are most important to them. Because the transportation 
network is so important, equal respect for fellow citizens demands that they have some 
voice in its delivery. A market-norm driven transportation system would allow people to 
choose not to travel, but would not provide opportunities for them to weigh in on the 
future goals or priorities of the system.  
The transportation system is subject to monopolies and high barriers to entry. The 
American Society of Civil Engineers estimates that the US would need to spend $101 
billion every year just to maintain the current road and bridge networks at their current 
states (2013). Laying down new flexible pavements costs $120,000-$250,000 per mile 
even when no special terrain features increase the complexity of the project (Federal 
Highway Administration, 2006). Furthermore, roadway projects have expected lifecycles 
of 30-40 years and heavily influence the built environment around them resulting in 
significant changes to the areas in which they are placed. These large impacts point to a 
need for citizens to have a voice in the way the network changes their lives. 
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2.3.1 Toll Road Related Equity Concerns- Literature Review 
This brings us to toll roads, which have long been accused of increasing inequity 
in a number of ways. The most important burden that tolls impose is financial. Tolls are 
typically imposed across bridges or other bottlenecks precisely because it is difficult to 
choose a route that avoids the toll. Harvey (1991) and Giuliano (1992) make this point, 
noting that tolls create winners and losers and do not lead to a Pareto improvement as 
workers in areas with poor transit are highly likely to pay bridge tolls at peak hours 
because they lack alternatives. A 2009 study by the Washington State Department of 
Transportation found that the impacts of tolls are highly dependent upon geography, rates 
of car ownership, level of employment, ability to switch modes, and the opportunity to 
choose routes that avoid the toll. Under the scenarios that were examined, a $2 toll across 
bridges in the Seattle area would impose an annual cost of $2600 per family, an amount 
equal to 15% of the federal poverty income level, as they traveled for work (Plotnick, 
Romich, & Thacker, 2009). These are significant costs for low-income travelers, many of 
whom must travel to downtown Seattle for work but are not paid enough to afford to live 
closer to their workplace. Higher income travelers also possess more flexibility to change 
their residence in order to respond to such costs. 
Tolls are also opposed because they can create environmental costs and 
congestion in poorer neighborhoods when travelers choose to use local roads in order to 
avoid the toll. Even when tolls are accompanied by promises that the revenue will be 
reinvested in the community, e.g. through increased transit funding, many local 
stakeholders are mistrustful. Transit authority promises of increased mass transit service 
or new lines are often not credible because the places that have to pay the fee are often in 
areas that are not traditionally well-served by transit. Two examples are the San Gabriel 
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Valley reaction to high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes, where a free lane is available but 
there is an immediately parallel tolled lane that can be used to escape congestion, on 
Interstates 110 and 10 in 2009 and the outer borough reaction to Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg’s 2007 plan to institute a congestion charge in lower Manhattan (Taylor & 
Kalauskas, 2010).  
Resistance to Bloomberg’s congestion scheme (one quite similar to the London 
cordon charge) demonstrates both of these phenomena. Opposition to the plan centered 
around data that showed the funds raised would largely come from lower-middle class 
families and skepticism that raised funds would in fact be used on transit. Assemblyman 
Richard Brodsky laid out these arguments in a report on the proposal (2007). Data 
collected from the city showed that residents of Queens, the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Staten 
Island, who had a collected average income of $46,004, would account for 47% of the 
total fees while making 24% of tolled trips. Residents of Manhattan, with an average 
income of $74,676, would pay 42% of fees but make 72% of trips in the affected area. 
The toll, if paid daily by a commuter, would come to about $2000 per annum, which 
would be ~4.5% of the annual income of a driver from Bronx, Brooklyn, or Queens, but 
only ~2.7% of the income of a driver from Manhattan. 
These tolls also faced equity-oriented resistance because of concerns that the 
tolling scheme would divert traffic onto overburdened local streets and that this would 
worsen environmental pollution along alternate routes. Many of the neighborhoods most 
concerned by the potential for diversion onto their local streets had long been neglected 
by the city and felt they had little to gain from the promised benefits. Assembly Speaker 
Sheldon Silver argued that the toll plan could not adequately handle traffic diverted onto 
local streets and that this would worsen environmental pollution along the route and in 
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some of the poorest neighborhoods that lay just outside the congestion fee zone (Hakim, 
2007). 
 Time-varying tolls aimed at reducing congestion have also been heavily 
criticized on equity grounds. First, these systems work best with cashless transactions, 
but poorer travelers are less likely than affluent travelers to have credit cards or bank 
accounts, which makes it both more difficult and more expensive to access facilities with 
electronic tolling systems (Plotnick, Romich, & Thacker, 2009). A second worry is that 
many poor travelers face constrained schedules that effectively force them to travel at 
peak periods in the same way that bridges across rivers would effectively force poorer 
travelers in Washington to use tolled bridges. For instance, single mothers must pick up 
and drop their kids off in narrow windows and so avoid nonstandard working hours if at 
all possible (Presser, 1995). 
2.3.2 Equitable Tolling 
Although many groups opposed to both time-varying and constant tolls have 
opposed them on equity grounds, others have argued that tolls do not have a uniform 
impact on equity because their effect on the road network is highly sensitive to the 
specifics of the proposed plan, particularly its price structure, quality of alternatives, use 
of raised revenues, and whether driving is a luxury or a necessity, i.e. whether transit or 
routes that avoid the toll are available (Litman, 1996; Litman, 2016; Rajé, 2003; Golub, 
2010; Schweitzer, 2009; Santos & Rojey, 2004). Thus, these authors concede that though 
there are particular implementations of time-varying tolls that may have regressive 
income effects, tolls can also be fine-tuned to have progressive outcomes.  
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Other researchers have argued that the equity implications of a time-varying toll 
are entirely dependent on the alternative methods available for funding transportation 
projects. In the US today, roadway projects are largely financed through either through 
general sales taxes or through a specific tax on gasoline products.12 This funding structure 
is highly regressive for a number of reasons. First, user fees are regressive by their nature. 
Poorer travelers have less money and so $1 in tax to them almost by definition represents 
more of their income than a $1 tax would represent for wealthier travelers. An 
examination State Route 91 in Orange County, CA found that funding the road through a 
sales tax heavily burdened the poorest families. Table 2, adapted directly from 
Schweitzer and Taylor (2008), shows that the poorest travelers, with a median income of 
only $7,000 pay roughly $3.4M per year in sales taxes that would be earmarked for the 
road, but almost none of them would use the road if it were tolled. Middle income 
Table 2: Estimated contributions by each of five income groups to SR91 Express Lanes 
costs (Schweitzer & Taylor, 2008). 
Group Median 
Income 
Sales taxes Tolls Gain or Loss Loss/Gain 
per family 
1 Low $7,126 $3,353,241  $0.00 -$3,353,242  -$66.60 
2 Low-Mid  22,221 1,789,375 3,906,577 2,117,202  36.72 
3 Mid 40,902 3,977,632  7,345,369  3,367,737  42.47 
4 Mid-high  67,427 10,798,820  12,731,744  1,932,924  14.60 
5 High 180,830  14,080,930  10,006,040  -4,074,890 -27.46 
                                                 
12 The Federal tax rate for gasoline products is currently 18.3 cents per gallon and the state of Texas 
imposes a tax rate of an additional 20.0 cents per gallon (Heleman & Wright, Texas' Motor Fuels Taxes: 
Essential Levies Support Roads, Education, 2016). Municipalities have turned to local sales taxes to fund 
specific initiatives that go beyond the assistance they receive from either their Federal or State 
governments. One such example is the city of San Francisco, which levies a 0.25% sales tax on all retail 
sales to finance transit operations and paratransit services for disabled passengers and a 0.5% sales tax in 
Alameda, Contra Costa, and San Francisco counties to fund the Bay Area Rapid Transit Authority and the 
Metropolitan Transit Commission (Metropolitan Transport Commission, 2017). In Texas, 10 transit 
authorities levy local sales taxes to help fund their operations and 218 municipalities levy local sales taxes 
to fund street maintenance and repair (Heleman, 2016). 
31 
 
travelers, by contrast, receive an annual subsidy of $42.47 when the road is funded by a 
sales tax rather than a toll. 
Second, the poor are also the most likely to own older and less fuel-efficient 
vehicles. They spend more money (which is a larger percentage of their income) to go 
fewer miles and that disparity holds for all travel, not just for the most congested travel. 
In Gauteng, South Africa, there was a choice between tolls for freeways and area wide 
fuel taxes. The fuel tax was the most regressive means of funding the road because poorer 
travelers lived close to their workplaces and so mostly traveled on heavily congested 
local and arterial streets that made older vehicles even less fuel efficient. The revenues 
raised by the fuel taxes were then spent on improving the highway network that 
benefitted richer travelers (Venter & Joubert, 2014). 
Third, poorer travelers tend to live in the urban core and drive less frequently, so 
area-wide sales taxes tend to force them to subsidize infrastructure that they do not use. 
Thus, non-discriminating sales taxes pose problems for horizontal equity among 
travelers. If we adopt the principle that travelers should pay for the infrastructure that 
they use, then usage based fees are philosophically preferable to sales fees, because they 
charge people for the miles the congestion they cause as well as the miles they travel. 
That low-income households subsidize higher income households when infrastructure is 
funded by sales taxes is unavoidable. In general, low-income households make fewer 
trips than high income households, which means that these households would pay more 
on a per trip basis if funds are raised using sales taxes (Litman, 2016). Furthermore, low-
income households often choose to live in the urban core, because that gives them access 
to public transportation. Thus, financing roads through tolls removes this tax burden on 
the poor and possibly frees up household income to support public transit (Glaeser, Kahn, 
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& Rappaport, 2008). Finally, a Florida study examining strategies to decrease vehicle 
miles traveled found that a tradeable credit scheme would benefit low-income households 
because they would be able to trade away their credits and so receive compensation for 
traveling less (Mamun, Michalaka, Yin, & Lawphongpanich, 2016). A version of the 
tradeable credit scheme was implemented in Minnesota with some success. The state toll 
road authority, MnPass, credited every account with a positive balance that could be used 
and supplemented with a user’s funds. If a user chose not to travel on toll lanes, however, 
the funds could be applied towards registration fees, a cost savings that would benefit all 
drivers (Taylor & Kalauskas, 2010). 
2.4: TIME POVERTY 
Section 2.2 laid out an argumentative framework to help us evaluate the equity 
implications of any dynamic tolling scheme. If the tolling plan leads to an impoverished 
choice set for poorer travelers that substantially affects their ability to access primary 
social goods, then it is incumbent upon us to implement an equity based remedy to 
alleviate that harm. In this section, I raise a related body of literature on time poverty to 
add an additional dimension to the equity analysis. To understand the full implication of a 
dynamic tolling scheme we ought to look both at the economic costs borne by travelers as 
well as their departure time decisions. 
Time poverty should be included in an equity analysis because it has the same 
importance to travelers as unfairly distributed economic costs. First, low-income travelers 
experience poverty both with respect to money but also with respect to their time. 
Second, time poverty creates concerns that low-income travelers will be excluded from 
primary social goods. Third, the socially optimal dynamic tolling plan will exacerbate 
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these problems. Therefore, the dynamic tolling plan creates equity concerns and we 
should examine alternatives that mitigate this issue. 
2.4.1 Time Poverty Defined 
Academic research into time poverty owes its genesis to Clair Vickery’s 1977 
article, “The Time-Poor: A New Look at Poverty”. Vickery argued that measurements of 
poverty based solely upon household income miss an important aspect of poverty, 
namely that the time to fulfill basic household needs increases as income decreases. Her 
introduction to the thesis is classic: 
 
Since the official poverty index was developed in the mid-1960s by the Social 
Security Administration (SSA), their categorization by income has been accepted 
as an equitable criterion with which to compare different types of households. As 
a result, policy-makers have thought that adjusting the benefit structure of an 
income-transfer program for money differentials across house-holds corrected for 
the resource differences of these households. But households differ in their time 
resources as well as their money income. This paper argues that to base the 
benefit schedule of an income-support program on an index that defines poverty 
in terms of money income alone is to create gross inequities across households 
that vary in their number of adult hours. The equity problem, important in itself, 
takes on added significance when it creates incentives for individuals to adjust 
their living arrangements, and the problem becomes aggravated if the household 
structure appears to be in a transitional phase as in the 1970s. (Vickery, 1977) 
 
All households are constrained by a certain number of needs, including food 
purchase and preparation, cleaning, maintenance, and paying bills among many others. 
Completing these tasks requires household member time. Someone must plan dinner, go 
to the grocery store, pick out ingredients, wait in the checkout line, and then finally 
prepare the meal. It is possible to streamline this process somewhat, e.g. by buying in 
bulk, shopping for the entire week, and if household income is high enough it can be 
outsourced entirely by eating at restaurants, or hiring a maid, nanny, or personal shopper.  
34 
 
Although the literature covers a wide variety of perspectives, the discussion of 
time poverty has often been framed as a problem facing female managers as they struggle 
to balance long and demanding workdays with the traditional responsibilities of a 
homemaker (Rutherford, 2001; Simpsons, 1998; Rosin, 1990). But this focus on the 
upper-middle class and corporate executives misses the crucial experience of millions of 
low-income families. Anti-poverty assistance programs in the US, such as Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP), build an assumption that poor families will have ample time to perform 
unpaid household tasks into their support models. These programs were created at a time 
when the average American household had a very different structure. When President 
Lyndon Johnson began the War on Poverty with his Great Society Programs in the 1960s 
74.3% of households included married couples, by 2009 that number had shrunk to 
50.5%. In 1975, only 45.5% of women with children under the age of 18 were in the 
labor force; that number grew to 71.4% by 2008 (Albeda, 2011). The most recent Current 
Population Survey conducted by the US Census bureau in 2016 found that single mothers 
with no partner present formed fully 24.4% of all households in which a mother was 
present and that 16.1% of all US households with children are headed by a parent with no 
partner present (United States Census Bureau, 2016). The increasing number of 
employed women, even women heading single parent households, is largely attributable 
to the insistence that all assistance should be tied to efforts by the poor to find 
employment that would move them out of poverty. 
As the American family structure has changed, the time required for low-income 
households to keep the home running has put these families in a bind. As families move 
out of monetary poverty, they can find themselves suddenly time poor. For instance, 50-
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60% of unemployed single parents are below the monetary poverty threshold, but only 
3% are time poor (Harvey & Mukhopadhyay, 2007). When single parents are employed 
only 26-31% are monetarily poor, but 98% are time poor. Only 5.3% of single parents are 
neither time nor monetarily poor. Even a partner to share the load is not a panacea, since 
20-30% of employed two-parent families are still time poor (i.e. they work above the 
threshold of 11.5 hours per day per parent). 
The most pressing problem facing these families is often the problem of finding 
affordable childcare during working hours. Employed mothers, as one might expect 
spend significantly less time with their children and on housework (Bianchi, 2000; 
Sandberg & Hoffreth, 2001; Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006) and this difference can 
largely be explained by household income level (Kendig & Bianchi, 2008). Childcare is 
also problematic for working parents. When children are sick or school is not in session, 
it can be difficult to find a safe and affordable option short of calling out of work (which 
comes with its own set of problems). Interviews with poor and low-income employed 
women have consistently found that the high cost of childcare meant that many women 
felt they had to choose between clandestinely bringing their children to work, leaving 
them in unsafe situations, or being fired for missing work as a result of staying home with 
them (Scott, Edin, London, & Kissane, 2004; Dodson, 2007).  
Assumptions regarding the appropriate allocation of household time and money 
also stretch low-income household time budgets. Vickery (1977) found that the average 
household needed to spend about two hours per day household chores. But TANF 
assumes that low-income households stretch their food dollar by preparing all meals from 
scratch, suggesting recipes that take anywhere from 80 minutes to 2.5 hours per day to 
prepare on top of time required to purchase ingredients (Mancino & Newman, 2007). 
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Furthermore, TANF forbids households from saving time by purchasing premade 
foodstuffs. 
Families that do not fall into the income definition of poverty can still experience 
time poverty. This is because, even when extreme want is out of the equation, time 
poverty is a problem driven by the number of hours worked, when they are worked, and 
the physical intensity of that work (Warren, 2003). Persons score well with respect to 
time poverty when they have enough time (i.e. they are able to work the number of hours 
they desire but not so many as to have involuntary overtime), they have time at the right 
time of their day, week or season, they have control over their personal time, and their 
time fits into the rhythms of family and friends (Reisch, 2001). Higher paid workers can 
control when they work, where they work, and have more flexibility to take time off, 
which creates greater job satisfaction, lowers stress levels, and creates work-life balance 
(Industrial Society, 2001). And, as noted above, moving up the socio-economic scale 
allows people to “buy back” their time by paying others to do domestic chores (Gregson 
& Lowe, 1994; Roberts, 1998; Stephens, 1999). For other families, shift work and 
schedules that are driven by the employer’s need for flexibility rather than the 
employee’s have made it difficult for low-income families to have all these benefits. Shift 
work, even when parents are not employed in multiple jobs, leads to desynchronized 
family and social circle schedules (Presser, 1995; Roberts, 1998; Wheelock, 1990; 
Glucksmann, Cottons and Casuals: The Gender Organisation of Labour in Time and 
Space, 2000). Finding enough time at the right time can be challenging for all families, 
but an acute equity concern should be raised by the especially challenging landscape 
facing low-income families. 
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2.4.2 Exclusion from Fundamental Social Goods 
Time poverty ought to be a central focus of our equity evaluation because time is 
one of the most precious goods humans possess. Free time and to spend with friends and 
family and the flexibility to pursue varied projects is a fundamental social good for both 
intrinsic and extrinsic reasons. Intrinsically, free time provides an opportunity for rest, 
social interaction, leisure participation, and self-realization, which makes it an important 
non-monetary welfare resource (Chatzitheochari & Arber, 2012). Philosophers, 
economists, and social theorists have consistently conceptualized free time as a primary 
good for individual well-being (Marx & Engels, 1968; Rawls, 1999; Putnam, 2000; 
Vickery, 1977; Fraser, 1994; Douthitt, 2000; Blackden & Wodon, 2008; Dodson, 2007; 
Hochschild, 1997a). Empirical research has shown that free time activities bring 
numerous benefits to people’s health, and to subjective and family well-being (Iso-Ahola 
& Mannell, 2004; Coleman & Iso-Ahola, 1993). This right is so fundamental that it is 
recognized in a number of international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UN, 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (UN, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966), and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989). These political documents 
recognize the fact that human beings work in order to participate in those activities and to 
be with those people who make life interesting and fun. The principles of equal respect 
articulated by Rawls help us to understand why these goods should be shared by all 
citizens and not just the wealthy. Possessing time that is not controlled by an obligation to 
work for others or to fulfill biological needs is also crucial to the pursuit of many other 
projects. Most importantly, it is crucial to fulfilling our roles as citizens. Anderson (1993) 
notes that participatory democracy requires both spaces for us to encounter fellow 
38 
 
citizens as well as the time to learn about public issues, participate in civil actions, and 
decide issues of social importance.  
In the next chapter, we will examine a toll scheme whose goal is the minimization 
of the total cost to all travelers by setting the toll in such a way that travelers will choose 
to travel at exactly the capacity of a system bottleneck. We will carefully examine 
whether a tolling scheme meeting this objective leads to either disproportionate or 




Chapter 3: The Single Link Economic Model- Formulation and 
Discussion 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
The first proposals for dynamic tolling can be found in the economics literature of 
the early 1920s. Congestion arises because of an externality, viz. my decision to queue 
causes a disutility paid for by others and not captured by the costs I must pay. Therefore, 
every traveler has an incentive to discount the true cost of their decision to travel. Arthur 
Pigou in his classic The Economics of Welfare (1920) defined “incidental uncharged 
disservices”, what are now referred to as ‘externalities’, as costs that affect parties which 
are not party to a contract agreement. The following passage is typical. 
 
Thus, incidental uncharged disservices are rendered to third parties when the 
game-preserving activities of one occupier involve the overrunning of a 
neighbouring occupier's land by rabbits—unless, indeed, the two occupiers stand 
in the relation of landlord and tenant, so that compensation is given in an 
adjustment of the rent. They are rendered, again, when the owner of a site in a 
residential quarter of a city builds a factory there and so destroys a great part of 
the amenities of the neighbouring sites; or, in a less degree, when he uses his site 
in such a way as to spoil the lighting of the houses opposite: or when he invests 
resources in erecting buildings in a crowded centre, which, by contracting the air 
space and the playing-room of the neighbourhood, tend to injure the health and 
efficiency of the families living there. (Pigou, 1920) 
 
Because externalities by definition lead actors to misestimate the true costs and 
benefits of their actions they cause those actors to over- or under-produce. The most 
economically efficient remedy is for the state to respectively tax or subsidize these 
behaviors, where the actor’s cost is adjusted to reflect their marginal impact on social 
welfare. 
In traffic congestion, the excess costs imposed on other travelers call for a tax or 
fee. William Vickrey wrote the first seminal papers on congestion pricing theory to solve 
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the problem of underpriced transportation infrastructure beginning in the 1950s. Vickrey 
set out the conceptual framework for peak hour charges in his recommendations for 
pricing the New York City Subway. Passengers should be charged, he argued, according 
to the marginal cost that they impose on all other travelers. (For instance, 20 additional 
passengers may so crowd the subway car that the other 200 passengers already in the car 
would pay 3 cents to get rid of them. This means that they have imposed a cost of 30 
cents each on everyone, but they themselves only feel 3 cents worth of discomfort.) He 
also advocated distance based pricing for transit, similar to the one used for the Tokyo 
subway, where users would pay the highest fare upon entering the system and be 
reimbursed at the end of their trip in order to prevent fare jumping (Vickrey, 1955). 
In addition to articulating a need for value pricing, Vickrey also contributed to the 
literature by creating what is now known as the “Vickrey bottleneck” model, which is an 
idealization of a road network that allows for the analytical inspection of various 
solutions to congestion (Vickrey, 1969). The simplest version of the bottleneck is a single 
link between the origin and destination. The road has unlimited capacity before and after 
the bottleneck, but at the bottleneck has a limited throughput capacity. The result is 
similar to the concept of a point queue model in dynamic traffic assignment. The network 
can then be modified to add additional links or bottlenecks as necessary to discuss new 
scenarios. The genius of this approach is that the problem to be analyzed stays in sharp 
focus while also remaining analytically tractable with a solution space that has a 
geometric and intuitive explanation. 
While I will discuss the relevant conclusions of the bottleneck model below in 
Section 3.2, I want to now briefly survey some of the important work that has been done 
using this model as a basis. The direct inspiration for this thesis, a two-decade corpus of 
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work by Richard Arnott, Robin Lindsey, and André de Palma explores a wide variety of 
scenarios. Their earliest papers described the Vickrey bottleneck to derive pricing 
schemes and estimates of welfare (1987a)13, optimal capacity for an optimally tolled 
roadway (1987b), and the welfare effects of a coarse stepped toll (1990a). They also 
derived welfare costs and departure time decisions for travelers choosing between tolled 
and no-toll facilities (1990b). 
Since then, they have examined a version of the Braess paradox on freeways that 
can be alleviated through ramp metering (1993a) and other alternatives to road pricing 
(Arnott, 1994). Their work has since attempted to increase the realism of their model 
through incorporating stochastic demand and bottleneck capacity (1999), better 
estimating the externalities imposed on non-travelers (Arnott, 2007), and revisiting 
stepped tolls with a more complex model of traveler behavior (Lindsey, van den Berg, & 
Verhoef, 2012). Some of their most recent work has steps outside of the strict analytic 
Vickrey bottleneck but stays within the spirit of that project by examining the congestion 
behavior of married couples that wish to coordinate their departure times and they show 
that marriage can increase the costs of peak hour congestion (de Palma, Lindsey, & 
Picard, 2015). They have also published high-level summaries of their work on the 
Vickrey bottleneck that serve as helpful reference texts (1993b; de Palma & Lindsey, 
2004). 
3.2 DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS 
Trips along the Vickrey bottleneck model have five stages. A departure, a free 
flow period to the bottleneck, a congested phase while waiting for prior vehicles to pass 
                                                 
13 Some of their work on heterogeneous traveler groups was first written into working papers but only 
published later, see (Arnott, Palma, & Lindsey, 1994). 
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the bottleneck, passing the bottleneck, and an arrival. The bottleneck is assumed to 
function perfectly, allowing travelers to pass through at a rate 𝐷 vehicles per minute. 
Travelers are assumed to belong to a homogeneous group of similar travelers of size 
𝑁 who have identical characteristics and preferences.  
Their primary characteristics relate to their perceived utility of travel. All travelers 
in the group wish to arrive at the destination at a single point in time, 𝜏∗. Think of the 
bottleneck as modeling the commuting decisions of workers arriving to start a standard 
morning work shift. Either picture the group of travelers as workers at a single factory on 
the far edge of (a very narrow) bridge or, at a more abstract level, all of the workers in a 
city choosing to use a much larger bottleneck. All travelers possess a general value of 
time, 𝛼 (e.g. dollars per minute). This represents the perceived cost of a minute of time 
spent traveling or waiting in a queue. These costs are typically high, as time spent in 
traffic is essentially “wasted”. Although travelers may now be able to conduct some 
business or catch up with a friend using a cell phone, travelers are not able to engage in 
many preferred leisure activities or business that requires extended visual concentration.  
Travelers also have schedule delay penalties for early and late arrival, 𝛽 and 𝛾, 
respectively. These factors represent the cost of having to wait at one’s destination rather 
than arriving exactly on time. In the commuting case, these penalties are intuitively 
understood to be influenced by whether the worker has a flexible schedule that permits 
them to be productive before the desired start time, the magnitude of penalties the worker 
faces for arriving late, and other schedule constraints that may make it costly for the 
worker to arrive before or after their start time (e.g. convenience charges by childcare 
services to drop a child off early). 
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Here is an example of how the bottleneck can be interpreted. Traveler 𝑖 departs at 
𝑡𝑖, experiences a free flow travel time, 𝐹𝐹, waits in a queue of length 𝑞(𝑡), passes the 
bottleneck, and arrives at her destination at 𝜏𝑖. Because there is more than one traveler in 
each group of travelers, let us generalize the individual case to say that 𝑛(𝑡) travelers 
depart over an infinitesimal period at 𝑡. While the physical interpretation of such a model 
requires that vehicles be discrete entities, a choice to model the travelers as an infinitely 
divisible fluid creates a smooth and predictable distribution of departures and arrivals that 
is derivable and so time is considered to be continuous (although of course in a numerical 
solution it must be treated in a discrete fashion). Travelers in the model transition 
instantly from free flow to waiting in a queue to arriving at their destination. This is 
analogous to point queue models used in dynamic traffic assignment, where there is no 
backward shockwave and vehicles are able to depart as soon as their turn arrives (Zhang, 
Nie, & Qian, 2013; Szeto & Lo, 2006; Kuwahara & Akamatsu, 1997). 
The utility of each traveler is captured in a cost function, 𝐶(𝑡), which is composed 
of four distinct costs: the cost (determined by 𝛼) of the time required to travel from the 
origin to the destination in free flow conditions, 𝐹𝐹(𝑡); the cost of the time required to 
wait in any queue that exceeds the bottleneck’s discharge rate, 𝑇𝑇(𝑡); the schedule delay 
cost (determined by 𝛽 and 𝛾) created by arriving at the destination at a time other than the 
preferred arrival time, 𝑆𝐷(𝑡); the direct cost of a toll that is imposed, 𝑇𝑅(𝑡). Each these 
costs can vary over the peak hour and it is possible for a subset of the costs to be equal to 
0. For instance, it is possible to vary the toll rate in order to encourage travelers to choose 
a departure rate that is less than or equal to the discharge rate of the bottleneck, 𝑛(𝑡) ≤ 𝐷 
and then if the length of the queue is zero, 𝑇𝑇(𝑡𝑖) = 0. 
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Table 3: Key terms and variables in the Vickrey bottleneck model with a homogeneous 
traveling population. 
𝑡𝑖 Traveler departure time for traveler 𝑖. (If the number of the traveler has no 
special importance, this is shortened to 𝑡.)  
𝜏𝑖 Traveler arrival time for traveler 𝑖. (If the number of the traveler has no 
special importance, this is shortened to 𝜏.) 
𝑡0
 Departure time of the first traveler. 
𝑡𝑓 Departure time of the final traveler. 
𝑡𝑖𝑗 Transitional departure time when travel switches between groups 𝑖 and 𝑗 in 
a scenario with heterogeneous traveling groups. 
𝜏0 Arrival time of the first traveler. 
𝜏𝑓 Arrival time of the final traveler. 
𝜏∗ Desired arrival time of all travelers. 
𝑡∗ Departure time of the traveler who arrives at 𝜏∗. 
𝛼 Value of time during travel. 
𝛽 Schedule delay penalty for early arrival. 
𝛾 Schedule delay penalty for late arrival. 
𝐷 Discharge rate of the bottleneck. 
𝑁 The total number of travelers in the network over the peak hour. 
𝑛(𝑡) Number of travelers choosing to depart at 𝑡. 
𝐹𝐹 Free Flow Travel Time along corridor. 
𝑞(𝑡) Queue length experienced by travelers departing at 𝑡. 
𝐶(𝑡) The sum of costs facing an individual traveler who departs at 𝑡. 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡) The free flow costs facing an individual traveler who departs at 𝑡. 
𝑇𝑇(𝑡) The travel time costs facing an individual traveler who departs at 𝑡. 
𝑆𝐷(𝑡) The schedule delay costs facing an individual traveler who departs at 𝑡. 
𝑇𝑅(𝑡) The toll rate paid by an individual traveler who departs at 𝑡. 
𝑇𝐶 The total travel costs incurred by all travelers over the peak hour. 
𝐹𝐹𝐶 Fixed costs of traveling at free flow when no other travelers are present. 
𝑆𝐷𝐶 The sum of the schedule delay costs over all travelers. 
𝑇𝑇𝐶 The sum of the waiting time costs encountered by all travelers. 
𝑇𝑅𝐶 The sum of the toll costs paid by all travelers over the peak hour. 
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3.3 ASSUMPTIONS AND GENERAL COST EXPRESSIONS 
To determine the travel departure choice behavior of a homogeneous group of 
travelers, we make three assumptions about their choices and the structure of the 
bottleneck. 
1) All travelers are purely rational. They will travel only at times that minimize their 
generalized costs. There is a great deal of interesting research to be done on the 
estimation of stochastic parameters of traveler choices under uncertainty or non-
rationality, but the rationality assumption allows us to retain analytical 
tractability. 
2) Because travelers are purely rational, Wardrop’s (1952) principles tell us that the 
generalized cost of travel will be the same at every time travelers choose to travel 
at all. If this were not the case, then some travelers could decrease their own costs 
by choosing travel earlier or later. That is, for all travelers in a homogeneous 
group, 
𝐶(𝑡𝑖) = 𝐶(𝑡𝑗), 𝑡0 ≤ 𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑡𝑗 ≤ 𝑡𝑓 
3) The free flow travel time of the bottleneck is zero. A constant free flow term 
merely adds a constant term to all of the cases in the proof, but the general lessons 
of the model are most clear when this constant term is left to the side. Thus, 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡) = 0,          𝑡0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑓 
Given these assumptions we can make the following identity and definitional 
statements for the problem. 
i. 𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐹𝐹(𝑡) + 𝑇𝑇(𝑡) + 𝑆𝐷(𝑡) + 𝑇𝑅(𝑡), ∀𝑡 𝑡0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑓 
ii. 𝑆𝐷(𝑡) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋 (𝛽 ∗ (𝜏∗ − 𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹 −
𝑞(𝑡)
𝐷










iv. 𝑞(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) = 𝑞(𝑡) + ∫ (𝑛(𝑡) − 𝐷) 𝑑𝑡
𝛿𝑡
𝑡
   
v. 𝜏0 = 𝑡0 
vi. 𝜏𝑓 = 𝜏0 +
𝑁
𝐷




Statement (i) is definitional and captures all potential cost components facing the 
traveler. Depending on the model and the time a particular traveler departs, one or more 
of these terms may be equal to zero (e.g. travel time costs are zero for the first traveler at 
the beginning of the peak hour, and schedule delay costs are zero when a traveler arrives 
exactly at their desired arrival time, and 𝐹𝐹 = 0 at all times for this discussion). The 
costs of actively traveling, 𝐹𝐹(𝑡) and 𝑇𝑇(𝑡), are equal to the time spent traveling 
multiplied by the traveler’s value of time, 𝛼. Schedule delay costs are determined by the 
different in actual arrival time and the desired arrival time multiplied by the early or late 
arrival penalty, 𝛽 or 𝛾 respectively. Because 𝐹𝐹 = 0 we can assert that the first vehicle, 
facing no queue from prior vehicles, will arrive at its destination at the moment it enters 
the bottleneck. Furthermore, because the bottleneck will be used at its full capacity for as 
long as any vehicles travel, 𝑁 cars can be discharged at a rate 𝐷 in 𝜏𝑓 − 𝜏0 minutes. We 
know that the bottleneck will be fully utilized to discharge vehicles because if, arguendo, 
it was not, then a vehicle could arrive closer to 𝜏∗ without incurring additional costs by 
traveling at that underutilized moment. 
3.4 ANALYTICAL SOLUTION AND DISCUSSION FOR DEPARTURE RATES, USER COSTS AT 
T FOR A SINGLE TRAVELER CLASS IN USER EQUILIBRIUM WITH NO TOLL 
Given Wardrop’s principles it is possible to analytically determine rates of 
departure that will satisfy the equal and minimal cost conditions. The departure rates of 
travelers in a homogeneous group and the costs experienced by the group are 
exhaustively examined in an unpublished working paper by Arnott, de Palma, and 
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Lindsey (1987a). In the following section, I will briefly highlight and then independently 
derive the most important findings. 
The prior assumptions and definitions allow us to derive the rates at which 




𝐷, 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡∗
𝛼
𝛼+𝛾









𝐷(𝑡∗ − 𝑡0) −
𝛾
𝛼+𝛾
𝐷(𝑡 − 𝑡∗),               𝑡 ≥ 𝑡∗
 










Note that 𝑛(𝑡) > 𝐷 at the beginning of the peak hour and so a queue accumulates. 
Because of this, the vehicle which arrives at 𝜏∗ must leave at some time prior to 𝜏∗ and 







The departure rates of the Vickrey bottleneck create the departure curves depicted 
in Figure 1 and help us to understand the shape of departures during the peak hour. The 
red and green lines are the departures from the origin of travelers who arrive at the 
destination early and late, respectively. The orange line is the arrivals of vehicles as they 
are discharged through the bottleneck. The line 𝐴𝐸 is the time spent in queue by the 




The area of triangle 𝑂𝐴𝐵𝐴 represents the total travel time of all travelers in the 
system and consequently the travel time costs (TTC) of the system can be found by 
multiplying this area by 𝛼. The area of 𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑂 and 𝐸𝐶𝐵𝐸 are the total schedule delay 
(SDC) of all travelers and so schedule delay costs can be found by multiplying these 
areas by 𝛽 and 𝛾, respectively.  
If we rotate 𝑂𝐴𝐵𝑂 so that the arrival curve forms the x-axis, we find Figure 2, 
which shows the queue length facing travelers. The solid red line represents the time at 
which travelers should depart in order to arrive at the desired arrival time. If the total 
number of travelers increases, then the green triangle will grow, but its apex will remain 
along the red line. 





Figure 2: Cumulative queue facing travelers for all times, 𝑡. 
 
We will now turn to a rigorous proof of the relations discussed at the beginning of 
the section. Because the expressions for departure rates and queue lengths are piecewise, 
let us prove them in a piecewise manner, beginning with finding the four “breakpoints” in 
the model: 𝜏0, 𝜏𝑓 , 𝜏
∗, 𝑡∗. 




This is the minimum length of time that the peak hour could take because it is the 
shortest duration over which the entire traveling group could pass through the bottleneck 
and will occur when the bottleneck is used at capacity over the course of the peak period. 
𝜏𝑓 will not occur later than 𝜏0 +
𝑁
𝐷
 because, were the bottleneck not to be used at capacity, 
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then some traveler would be able to reduce their schedule delay cost by changing their 
departure time to take advantage of the unused capacity. 
We also know that at the margins of travel the only relevant costs are schedule 
delay costs. The first traveler does not face a queue, because ex hypothesi, she is first. 
The last traveler also will not face a queue.14  We also know that the costs of the first and 
last travelers are equal (or else traveler with a higher cost would travel at a different 
time); this allows us to find a relationship between the time the first traveler departs, the 
last traveler departs, and the desired arrival time. 
𝛽(𝜏∗ − 𝜏0) = 𝛾(𝜏𝑓 − 𝜏
∗) 















)  𝑸. 𝑬.𝑫.  
We now have a relationship between 𝜏∗, 𝜏0, and 𝜏𝑓, but because 𝑡
∗ is related to 𝜏∗ 
by 𝑞(𝑡∗), we must find a general expression for the length of the queue for all times 𝑡 ≤
𝑡∗. Because the cost of travel at all times is equal, we can find the cost of travel at two 
arbitrary times. 
𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐶(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡) + 𝑇𝑇(𝑡) + 𝑆𝐷(𝑡) + 𝑇𝑅(𝑡)
= 𝐹𝐹(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) + 𝑇𝑇(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) + 𝑆𝐷(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) + 𝑇𝑅(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) 




                                                 
14
  Assume that the last traveler did depart at a time when she faced a queue of length 𝑞(𝑡), then she will 
arrive at the destination at 𝑡 +
𝑞(𝑡)
𝑑
 and face a total cost of 𝛼 ∗
𝑛
𝑑
+ 𝛾 ∗ (𝜏 − 𝜏∗). This traveler could lower 
her individual cost by choosing to travel at 𝜏 and eliminating the cost for waiting in the queue. Q.E.D. 
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𝛽 (𝜏∗ − 𝑡 −
𝑞(𝑡)
𝐷
) + 𝛼 (
𝑞(𝑡) + 𝑛(𝑡) − 𝐷
𝐷
)
= 𝛽 (𝜏∗ − (𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) −
𝑞(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡)
𝐷
) + 𝛼 (









) = 𝛼 (
𝑞(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) + 𝑛(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) − 𝑞(𝑡) − 𝑛(𝑡)
𝐷
)  
Because schedule delay costs are linear with respect to time, a constant rate of 
departure over this time period that increases 𝑞(𝑡) at a constant rate will preserve equal 
cost departures, ergo 𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑛(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡). Furthermore, by identity (iv) the above equations 




) 𝛿𝑡 = 𝛼 (
𝑛(𝑡)
𝐷




𝑫 𝑸. 𝑬.𝑫. 
Given the rate of departures, the queue length faced by a traveler at any time 𝑡 is 
directly calculable. The queue is the difference in the total number of vehicles that have 
entered the system and those that have left by time 𝑡. 




𝑞(𝑡) = ∫ (
𝛼
𝛼 − 𝛽







𝑫(𝒕 − 𝒕𝟎) 𝑸. 𝑬.𝑫. 
 
Now that we have 𝑞(𝑡) it is possible to express the relationship between 𝜏∗ and 
𝑡∗. 




𝜏∗ = 𝑡∗ +
𝛽
𝛼 − 𝛽




















 𝐐. 𝐄. 𝐃. 
The same procedure provides 𝑛(𝑡) and 𝑞(𝑡) for 𝑡 > 𝑡∗ if we start from the 
assumption that 𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐶(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡). No toll is levied in this scenario, so 𝑇𝑅(𝑡) = 0 and 







− 𝜏∗) + 𝛼 (
𝑞(𝑡) + 𝑛(𝑡) − 𝐷
𝐷
)
= 𝛾 (𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝑞(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡)
𝐷
− 𝜏∗) + 𝛼 (




𝑞(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) − 𝑞(𝑡)
𝐷
) = 𝛼 (
𝑞(𝑡) − 𝑞(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡)
𝐷
) 




𝑫  𝑸. 𝑬.𝑫. 
This departure rate in turns entails the queue length for any time 𝑡, 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡∗. 




















𝑫(𝒕∗ − 𝒕𝟎) −
𝜸
𝜶 + 𝜸
𝑫(𝒕 − 𝒕∗)  𝑸. 𝑬.𝑫. 
We will later consider heterogeneous groups of travelers who differ in the value 
of time (𝛼), early (𝛽), and late (𝛾) arrival penalties. When that happens, it will be useful 
to know how many travelers in a group are arriving early and how many will choose a 
travel strategy to arrive late. We find this ratio by multiplying the departure rate for a 
group by the amount of early or late periods that they travel. Thus, the early arrival group 
is found by the following formula. 










The number of late arrivals follows. 
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The sum of the cost for all vehicles over the entire peak hour in a no-toll model to 
travel can be broken down into schedule delay and the travel cost. 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑆𝐷𝐶 + 𝑇𝑇𝐶 
Let us begin with the schedule delay costs. Figure 2 is helpful in visualizing the 
integral. 
𝑆𝐷𝐶 = ∫ 𝛽𝐷𝑡 𝑑𝑡
𝑡∗
𝑡0














































































Queue time costs are found by multiplying traveler’s value of time, α, by the 
length of time they spend in queue, i.e. length of queue divided by the discharge rate. It 
makes sense, then, that we should conceptualize this integral using the queue length 
graph (Figure 2).  
𝑇𝑇𝐶 = 𝛼 ∗
1
2
(𝑡𝑓 − 𝑡0) (
𝛽
𝛼 − 𝛽


























We can verify the relationships between departure rates, queuing behaviors, and 
costs through a script that simulates the departure behavior described by the 𝑛(𝑡) 
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equations and then evaluates TT(t) and SD(t). This numerical evaluation ensures that the 
departure profile results in equal costs trips for all travelers and fulfillment of the 
Wardrop conditions.15,16 
Table 4: 1 group homogeneous travelers- Base case parameters. 
Parameter Value 
𝐷 6 (veh/min) 
𝑁 60 veh 




Using a base case with parameters described in Table 4 creates an appropriate 
departure curve (Figure 3) and queue profile (Figure 4). We can verify that every traveler 
chooses to depart at an equal and minimal cost time through inspection of Figure 5, 
which shows that travelers in the user equilibrium departure profile exchange schedule 
delay costs for travel time costs at an equal rate as they choose to arrive closer to 𝜏∗. 
Table 5 examines the sensitivity of the 1-group user equilibrium no-toll scenario 
to changes in the parameters. Case 1 is the base case against which all changes are 
individually measured (and corresponds to the relationships found in Table 4).  The size 
of the variation tested in the table is not intended to represent “realistic” variations of the 
                                                 
15
 The code was developed in R-studio using R version 3.3.1 (“Bug in Your Hair”). Complete copies of the 
source code are available on request from the author. All scenarios were evaluated with 1,000,000 time 
steps. 
16
 The current case is so simple it hardly warrants a numerical validation of the results. However, cases with 
heterogeneous travelers are less amenable to an analytic solution, so the development of a numerical 
solution in this case serves as a sanity check for later results. 
17
 The Israeli shekel (₪) symbol is used to further underscore the break from empirical research and to 
guard against temptations to see these values in terms of US dollars or other familiar currency. 
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values, but solely to give an idea of the spread created by various values that are 
constrained by requirements of the model (e.g. 1 >
𝛼
𝛽




Figure 3: Departure and arrival profile for 1 group of travelers. 
 






Figure 5: Schedule delay and travel time costs for 1 group of travelers. 
 
The most interesting relationship occurs when the relationship between 𝛼, 𝛽, & 𝛾 
is varied. Because 𝛽 controls the relative cost of spending money on a toll or arriving 
early, the social cost always decreases as 𝛽 decreases relative to 𝛼; people are more 
willing to arrive early and so queuing costs and schedule delay costs decrease even as the 
total amount of time spent in schedule delay remains the same. As 𝛼/𝛽 → ∞, travelers 
will choose to depart at the discharge rate, 𝐷. The ratio of 𝛽/𝛾 determines the number of 
travelers who choose to arrive before 𝜏∗ and those who choose to arrive later. As 𝛽/
𝛾 increases, more travelers choose to arrive at their destination late, and this decreases the 












N 𝛼 𝛽 𝛾 SDC TTC TC 
1 6 60 6.00 2.00 8.00 479.99 479.99 959.99 
2 4 60 6.00 2.00 8.00 719.99 720.00 1439.99 
3 8 60 6.00 2.00 8.00 359.99 360.00 719.99 
4 6 40 6.00 2.00 8.00 213.32 213.33 426.65 
5 6 80 6.00 2.00 8.00 853.32 853.33 1706.65 
6 6 60 4.00 1.33 5.33 319.99 320.00 639.99 
7 6 60 8.00 2.67 10.67 639.99 639.99 1279.98 
8 6 60 6.00 2.40 9.60 575.99 576.00 1151.99 
9 6 60 6.00 1.71 6.86 411.42 411.42 822.83 
10 6 60 6.00 2.00 7.00 466.65 466.65 933.30 
11 6 60 6.00 2.00 9.00 490.90 490.90 981.80 
3.5 ANALYTICAL SOLUTION AND DISCUSSION FOR DEPARTURE RATES, USER COSTS AT 
T FOR A SINGLE TRAVELER CLASS IN USER EQUILIBRIUM WITH A SYSTEM OPTIMAL 
TOLL 
The fixed arrival curve means that 𝑆𝐷𝐶 is ineliminable and so provides a lower 
bound on 𝑇𝐶. In order to move closer to this optimum, the next scenario to consider is to 
find a tolling scheme that eliminates queuing delay by users. This is done by creating a 
time-dependent toll. For travelers departing at 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡∗ the toll rate is 𝛽(𝑡 − 𝑡0) and that for 
travelers departing at 𝑡 > 𝑡∗, the toll rate is 𝛽(𝑡∗ − 𝑡0) − 𝛾(𝑡 − 𝑡
∗). Because there is no 
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queuing, in a system with a system optimal toll, 𝑡∗ = 𝜏∗. For 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏∗, the objective of 
eliminating queuing occurs if 𝑛(𝑡) = 𝐷, 𝜏0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏𝑓. We can find the rate of increase of 
the toll by examining the cost of traveling at any two arbitrary times and enforcing a 
queue length of 0 (𝑞(𝑡) = 0). 
𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐶(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡) + 𝑆𝐷(𝑡) + 𝑇𝑇(𝑡) + 𝑇𝑅(𝑡)
= 𝐹𝐹(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) + 𝑆𝐷(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) + 𝑇𝑇(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) + 𝑇𝑅(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) 
𝛽(𝜏∗ − 𝑡) + 𝑇𝑅(𝑡) = 𝛽(𝜏∗ − 𝑡 − 𝛿𝑡) + 𝑇𝑅(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) 
𝑇𝑅(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) − 𝑇𝑅(𝑡) = 𝛽 𝛿𝑡 
The toll increases at a rate of 𝛽 and is 0 when 𝑡 = 0, so 𝑇𝑅(𝑡) = 𝛽(𝑡 − 𝑡0) up to 
a maximum of 𝑇𝑅(𝜏∗) = 𝛽(𝜏∗ − 𝜏0). 
After 𝑡∗, the toll begins to decrease. For 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡∗: 
𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐶(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) 
𝛾(𝑡 − 𝜏∗) + 𝑇𝑅(𝑡) = 𝛾(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 − 𝜏∗) + 𝑇𝑅(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) 
𝑇𝑅(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) − 𝑇𝑅(𝑡) = −𝛾 𝛿𝑡 
Thus, 𝑇𝑅(𝑡) = 𝛽(𝜏∗ − 𝑡0) − 𝛾(𝑡 − 𝜏
∗) down to a minimum of 𝑇𝑅(𝜏𝑓) = 0. 
The cost to travel when a system optimal toll is in place has two components. 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑆𝐷𝐶 + 𝑇𝑅𝐶 
Because the arrival rate with a system optimal toll remains the same as under a 











And, because the toll substitutes for the cost of congestion (the rate of increase for 
the toll is determined entirely by the cost required to prevent any traveler from having an 
incentive to queue), TRC is determined by the difference between TC and SDC. 






The difference between the toll and no-toll scenarios, of course, is that TTC in the 
no-toll scenario is a social dead loss. Any time spent in queue is time wasted and so 𝛼 
essentially represents the value of non-productive time. In contrast, TRC represents 
money collected by a tolling agency. And if the traveling public is reimbursed by the toll 
agency, then as a whole society will have suffered no loss. Obviously, travelers cannot be 
reimbursed by the exact amount that they paid into the system. A dollar for dollar 
reimbursement would mean that, although a traveler may need to wait a few weeks to 
receive their reimbursement check, they aren’t actually paying the amount of the toll. 
Thus, travelers would begin to queue again. 
This bug will appear in any reimbursement scheme that reimburses travelers 
according to the fees they pay. However, a flat reimbursement rate to all travelers will not 
create an incentive to spend more in tolls and so would preserve the social gain of 







 to each traveler. This number 
would be reduced by any overhead expenses and inescapable inefficiencies required to 
process the payments, but would nonetheless represent a significant rebate for all 
travelers.  Litman (1996; 2015; 2016) argues that, because road networks are already 
subsidized by taxes on non-drivers and through various externalities, the toll-payers are 
not even justified in demanding that the rebate be given to them as a class. Instead it 
ought to be spent on social priorities that benefit all of the public, such as water 
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infrastructure, mass transit or even parks. Skipping a detailed debate on this 
reimbursement scheme, the system optimal tolling scheme provides a strategy for 
capturing the social cost of queuing congestion and distributing that as a benefit. 
Table 6 examines the sensitivity of the 1-group tolling scheme to changes in the 
parameters. As with Table 5, case 1 is the base case against which all changes are 
individually measured.  The parameter variations appear in the same order as Table 5 to 
facilitate comparison between the no-toll and tolled equilibria. 




N 𝛼 𝛽 𝛾 SDC TRC TC 
1 6 60 6.00 2.00 8.00 480.00 480.00 960.00 
2 4 60 6.00 2.00 8.00 720.00 720.00 1440.00 
3 8 60 6.00 2.00 8.00 360.00 360.00 720.00 
4 6 40 6.00 2.00 8.00 213.33 213.33 426.66 
5 6 80 6.00 2.00 8.00 853.33 853.33 1706.66 
6 6 60 4.00 1.33 5.33 320.00 320.00 640.00 
7 6 60 8.00 2.67 10.67 640.00 640.00 1280.00 
8 6 60 6.00 2.40 9.60 576.00 576.00 1152.00 
9 6 60 6.00 1.71 6.86 411.43 411.43 822.86 
10 6 60 6.00 2.00 7.00 466.67 466.67 933.33 
11 6 60 6.00 2.00 9.00 490.91 490.91 981.82 
TRC perfectly substitutes (within rounding error) toll costs for travel time costs, 
TTC. The most interesting relationship occurs by changing the relationships between 
𝛼, 𝛽, & 𝛾. Because 𝛽 controls the relative cost of spending money on a toll or arriving 
early, the social cost always decreases as 𝛽 decreases relative to 𝛼; people are more 
willing to arrive early and so less of a toll is needed to deter travelers from queuing. The 
ratio of 𝛽/𝛾 determines the number of travelers who choose to arrive before 𝜏∗ and those 
who choose to arrive later. As 𝛽/𝛾 increases, more travelers choose to arrive at their 
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destination late, and this decreases the social costs of all travelers as the cost distribution 
becomes more normal. 
3.6 ANALYTICAL AND NUMERICAL SOLUTION AND DISCUSSION FOR DEPARTURE 
RATES, USER COSTS AT T FOR TWO TRAVELER CLASSES IN USER EQUILIBRIUM WITH 
NO TOLL 
The prior two sections presented the results of no-toll and system optimal toll 
equilibria for a group of traveler class with identical 𝛼, 𝛽, & 𝛾. But the world is not filled 
by identical clones who all want to travel to the same destination at the same time. Next 
consider a scenario where there are several distinct classes of travelers, each with their 
own 𝛼, 𝛽, & 𝛾. Examining this scenario will shine a light on potential equity issues with 
dynamic toll rate proposals because it will be possible to understand the disaggregated 
effects of such a proposal on each group. 
Let there be 𝐾 distinct classes of travelers of size 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛𝑘which are 
characterized by differing 𝛼, 𝛽, and γ, but constrained so that 𝜂 =
𝛽𝑘
𝛾𝑘
 ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. Let the 
value of time and schedule penalties be assigned to groups such that the groups can be 
ordered  𝛼1 > 𝛼2 > ⋯ > 𝛼𝑘. The intuitive representation of such a case is that the 
absolute value of time decreases as the number of the group increases and the ratio of the 
early to late schedule delay penalties are constant across all traveler groups. Having made 



















. The ratio of 
𝛼
𝛽
 represents the relationship between the absolute value of time 
while traveling and the early arrival schedule delay penalty; this ratio will always be 
greater than 1. Were it to be less than 1, then we would be modeling travelers who derive 
more benefit from waiting in traffic than arriving early to do paperwork or even sitting in 
the company parking lot. The shape of the peak rush hour and the fact that most workers 
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will do what they can to arrive at work a few minutes early shows that the assumption is 
reasonable. 
 In the first case, the traveler group with the highest absolute value of time has the 
lowest relative early (and by extension late) schedule delay penalty of all the traveler 
groups. Think here of a white-collar worker whose work is highly flexible. They would 
prefer to come to the office from 9am-5pm, say, but would be willing to shift their day’s 
schedule to 8-4 if that meant they would have a shorter commute. At the other end of the 
spectrum are workers who have a low value of time while delayed in traffic in absolute 
terms, but whose early delay penalty is almost as large as their overall value of time. This 
situation might most closely describe a blue collar shift worker who is not paid for 
arriving early but will be heavily penalized for arriving late. In the second case, although 
group 1 has the highest absolute value of 𝛼 and so possesses the greatest distaste for 
waiting in traffic overall, they are, relatively speaking, more amenable than group 2 to 
arriving early in order to avoid that traffic. 
 Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1987a) prove that the departure profile of 
heterogeneous travelers is highly analogous to the homogeneous cases examined in 
Section 3.4 & Section 3.5. Consider an early traveler in group 1 as though all travelers 
had her characteristics. This traveler is able to depart at any time prior to 𝑡∗ where 𝑛(𝑡) =
𝛼1
𝛼1−𝛽1
𝐷. If 𝑛(𝑡) is greater than this, then the length of the queue will grow so quickly that 
𝑇𝑇(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) + 𝑆𝐷(𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡) > 𝑇𝑇(𝑡) + 𝑆𝐷(𝑡) and group 1 will stop traveling. Conversely, 
if 𝑛(𝑡) is less, then more travelers from group 1 will have an incentive to travel at 𝑡 until 
𝑛(𝑡) rises. This is exactly the same behavior as was modeled in Section 3.4. 
These incentives don’t change for the individual just because other individuals 
have different priorities. Each individual minimizes her travel cost by choosing to travel 
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with other individuals who have the same characteristics. Thus, the size of 𝐾 is 
unimportant, because the structure of the departure choice model means that any 
conclusions we draw from a case with even two distinct traveler groups can be extended 
to an arbitrarily large number of groups.   
It is possible to derive the departure profiles through the same methods employed 
in Section 3.4 and full details of the proof can be found in Appendix B of Arnott, de 
Palma, and Lindsey (1987a). As 𝛼/𝛽 decreases, 𝑛(𝑡) consistent with an equal cost 






, then group 1 will depart first regardless of whether 






, then group 2 will depart first. Under both of these scenarios the two 






, the two 
groups will behave as though they are identical, because although the absolute cost of 
traveling at any arbitrary 𝑡 will differ across groups, the cost of traveling at 𝑡 to each 
group will be equal and minimal over the entire peak hour. Thus, each group’s departure 







𝐷, when late  
 
Note that the conditions under which the early and late departure rates for group 
𝑖 are no longer explicitly indexed to 𝑡∗. This is because when even two groups depart, 
there will be four departure rates over the peak hour: group 1 early, group 2 early, group 
2 late, and group 1 late. Call the transition time when the early travelers from group 1 
cease traveling and the early travelers from group 2 begin 𝑡12 and let 𝑡21 be the time 




Because there are more pieces to the piecewise function describing departure rates 
in the system, it is now more convenient to express the queue length as an integral or 
summation rather than in its most expanded form.  




The ratio of early to late travelers for each group remains the same and so because 
all traveling groups in this scenario possess the same ratio of 𝛽/𝛾, the first and last 
moments of departure is related to the ideal arrival time in the same way as though there 
were a single group traveling whose size is equal to the sum of all individual groups. 

















The other time-related “breakpoints” in the departure rates are given in a two 
group scenario by the following equations. 











































Let us closely examine a numerical case. As in Section 3.4, the chosen values of 
time and schedule delay were not selected based on real world conditions, but rather to 






Table 7: 2 group heterogeneous travelers- Base case parameters. 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
𝐷 6 (veh/min)   
𝑁1 30 veh 𝑁2 30 veh 
𝛼1 24 (₪/min) 𝛼2 12 (₪/min) 
𝛼1/𝛽1 3 𝛼2/𝛽2 2 
𝛾1/𝛽1 4 𝛾2/𝛽2 4 
Figure 6: Departure and arrival rate profile for 2 groups of travelers in a no-toll 
equilibrium. 
 




Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10, display the schedule delay cost, travel time 
cost, and total costs profiles for base case. In each figure, the costs are displayed as the 
cost that an individual traveler would face should she choose to depart at that moment in 
time. SDC, TTC, and TC can be found by summing the area under the solid line and 
multiplying it by the appropriate value of time or schedule delay factor. In Figure 8, note 
that schedule delay costs for each group change linearly, but that there is a piecewise 
jump between groups, because 𝛽1 > 𝛽2 & 𝛾1 > 𝛾2 and that per traveler schedule delay 
costs find a minimum at 𝑡∗ (-3.33 minutes) rather than 𝜏∗. In Figure 9, note that 𝑇𝑇(𝑡) is 
piecewise, which reflects the increase in the rate of queue accumulation aft 𝑡12. Finally, 
Figure 10 shows the sum of values in Figure 8 and Figure 9. We see that each group 
travels at its minimal period and that every chosen travel time has minimal cost.  








Figure 9: Travel time cost profile for 2 groups of travelers in a no-toll equilibrium. 
 
Table 8 provides a picture of the sensitivity of the model to changes in all 
parameters. In scenarios 1-19, 𝛼1 > 𝛼2 and is usually about twice as large. As a naïve 
rule, then, we might expect the total cost accrued by group 1, 𝑇𝐶1, to be about twice as 
large as the cost accrued by group 2, 𝑇𝐶2.  In the base case, group 1 pays just under twice 
the cost of group 2 – 61.54% of 𝑇𝐶 is borne by group 1. Scenarios 2 and 3 show that a 
change in the discharge rate, 𝐷, proportionally increases or decreases the total cost of the 
system, but maintains the proportion of costs.  




Table 8: Sensitivity of schedule delay, travel time, and total costs to parameters for the no-toll equilibrium. (Subscripts indicate 
group number.) 
No. D N1 𝛼1 𝛽1 𝛾1 N2 𝛼2 𝛽2 𝛾2 SDC SDC1 SDC2 TTC TTC1 TTC2 TC TC1 TC2 
1 6 30 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 1800.0 1440.0 360.0 1320.0 480.0 840.0 3120.0 1920.0 1200.0 
2 4 30 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 2700.0 2160.0 540.0 1980.0 720.0 1260.0 4680.0 2880.0 1800.0 
3 8 30 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 1350.0 1080.0 270.0 990.0 360.0 630.0 2340.0 1440.0 900.0 
4 6 30 16 5.3 21.3 30 8 4 16 1200.0 960.0 240.0 880.0 320.0 560.0 2080.0 1280.0 800.0 
5 6 30 32 10.7 42.7 30 16 8 32 2400.0 1920.0 480.0 1760.0 640.0 1120.0 4160.0 2560.0 1600.0 
6 6 30 24 8.0 28.0 30 12 6 21 1750.0 1400.0 350.0 1283.3 466.7 816.7 3033.3 1866.7 1166.7 
7 6 30 24 8 36 30 12 6 27 1840.9 1472.7 368.2 1350.0 490.9 859.1 3190.9 1963.6 1227.3 
8 6 30 18 6 24 30 12 6 24 1440.0 1080.0 360.0 1200.0 360.0 840.0 2640.0 1440.0 1200.0 
9 6 30 30 10 40 30 12 6 24 2160.0 1800.0 360.0 1440.0 600.0 840.0 3600.0 2400.0 1200.0 
10 6 30 24 9.6 38.4 30 12 6 24 2088.0 1728.0 360.0 1512.0 576.0 936.0 3600.0 2304.0 1296.0 
11 6 30 24 6.9 27.4 30 12 6 24 1594.3 1234.3 360.0 1182.9 411.4 771.4 2777.1 1645.7 1131.4 
12 6 30 24 8 32 30 6 3 12 1620.0 1440.0 180.0 900.0 480.0 420.0 2520.0 1920.0 600.0 
13 6 30 24 8 32 30 18 9 36 1980.0 1440.0 540.0 1740.0 480.0 1260.0 3720.0 1920.0 1800.0 
14 6 30 24 8 32 30 12 8 32 1920.0 1440.0 480.0 1440.0 480.0 960.0 3360.0 1920.0 1440.0 
15 6 30 24 8 32 30 12 4.8 19.2 1728.0 1440.0 288.0 1248.0 480.0 768.0 2976.0 1920.0 1056.0 
16 6 20 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 1213.3 853.3 360.0 893.3 213.3 680.0 2106.7 1066.7 1040.0 
17 6 40 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 2493.3 2133.3 360.0 1853.3 853.3 1000.0 4346.7 2986.7 1360.0 
18 6 30 24 8 32 20 12 6 24 1280.0 1120.0 160.0 960.0 480.0 480.0 2240.0 1600.0 640.0 
19 6 30 24 8 32 40 12 6 24 2400.0 1760.0 640.0 1760.0 480.0 1280.0 4160.0 2240.0 1920.0 
20 6 30 12 4 16 30 24 12 48 1440.0 720.0 720.0 1920.0 240.0 1680.0 3360.0 960.0 2400.0 
21 6 30 24 12 48 30 12 4 16 2400.0 2160.0 240.0 1680.0 720.0 960.0 4080.0 2880.0 1200.0 
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Cases 16-19 show that changing the number of travelers in one group but not the 
other creates some changes in cost for both groups, but that the effects are largely 
confined to the group whose numbers change.  For instance, a 33% drop in the number of 
group 1 travelers (Case 16) decreases 𝑆𝐷𝐶 for group 1 but not group 2 as would be 
expected since the portion of the peak period where group 2 arrives does not change. But 
the gains in welfare from decreased 𝑇𝑇𝐶 are shared. Of the 32.3% decrease in 𝑇𝑇𝐶 
overall, group 1 experiences a 55.6% decrease in its own 𝑇𝑇𝐶, while group 2 experiences 
a 19% decrease in 𝑇𝑇𝐶. Scenarios 8, 9, 12, and 13 show that when 𝛼 varies (and this 
change is carried over into the schedule delay terms), the corresponding decrease in 
social cost is confined to the group whose 𝛼 changes. This result makes perfect sense 
since the variation does not affect a group’s internal relative penalties to queue or arrive 
early.  
Finally, I want to draw the reader’s attention to cases 20 and 21, which examine 
traveler behavior when the lower wage group also has a lower relative schedule delay 
penalty. In cases 20 and 21, we see the results of a test where the departure order is not 
enforced. In each of these scenarios group 1 is manually compelled to travel first and 






. Figure 11 displays the total cost 
profile when group 1 is constrained to travel first in case 21. Case 20 reports the cost 
results that result from following proper departure order. Case 21 reports the cost if they 
travel in the wrong order. Figure 11 shows the total cost to each traveler when they travel 
out of order. Each group travels during a time when its cost profile is equal but not 
minimal. Each group could lower their cost by choosing to travel at another time. In 
contrast, Figure 12 shows the total cost profile of Scenario 20 where the groups are 
allowed to travel in the order specified at the beginning of the section, i.e. in order of 
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decreasing 𝛼/𝛽. These two figures visually prove the correctness of the departure order 
and we can also verify from Table 8 that the correct order results in lower total costs than 
an insistence that the groups travel in some other order. 
Figure 11: Total individual cost profile for 2 groups when 𝛼1/𝛽1 < 𝛼2/𝛽2 and group 1 is 
constrained to travel first. (Case 21.) 
 
Figure 12: Total individual cost profile for 2 groups when 𝛼1/𝛽1 < 𝛼2/𝛽2, but groups 




3.7 ANALYTICAL AND NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS AND DISCUSSION FOR DEPARTURE 
RATES, USER COSTS AT T FOR TWO TRAVELER CLASSES IN USER EQUILIBRIUM WITH A 
SYSTEM OPTIMAL TOLL 
Section 3.6 extended the single group no-toll equilibrium to a case with two 
distinct traveling groups. This section does the same for the Section 3.5 system optimal 
equilibrium. As in Section 3.5, the system optimal toll, which minimizes 𝑇𝐶, considered 
by Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey has two properties: 1) a single toll is charged to all 
travelers who decide to depart at 𝑡, call this 𝑇𝑅(𝑡); 2) the optimal toll is one that 
increases quickly enough travelers will choose not to queue but not so quickly that the 
bottleneck will be used at less than full capacity.18  
With these restrictions in mind and the lesson from Section 3.5 that the toll rate 
profile is determined by the schedule delay costs of the traveler group (and not the 
general value of time), the toll rate for two groups of travelers are given by the following 
set of equations. Let there be 𝐾 distinct classes of travelers of size 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛𝑘which are 
characterized by differing 𝛼, 𝛽, and γ, but constrained so that 𝜂 =
𝛽𝑘
𝛾𝑘
 for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. The 
value of time and schedule penalties should be assigned to groups such that the groups 
can be ordered  𝛽1 ≥ 𝛽2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝛽𝑘.19 Then it will be the case that the following toll rate 
schedule will combine with 𝑆𝐷(𝑡) to maintain an equal and minimal 𝐶(𝑡) (Arnott, de 
Palma, & Lindsey, 1987a). 
                                                 
18
 Note that in the model under consideration the absolute value of the toll is unimportant. Travelers do not 
have a choice to stay home even if the toll begins at $1000. Since they must travel, their objective is to 
minimize that cost and their only choice the tradeoff they can make between the toll they pay and the time 
they arrive through the bottleneck. In this tradeoff, only the rate of increase of the toll is important to their 
decision. 
19








𝛽1(𝑡 − 𝜏0),                                                                                                 𝜏0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏12
𝛽1(𝜏12 − 𝜏0) + 𝛽2(𝑡 − 𝜏12),                                                                   𝜏12 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏
∗
𝛽1(𝜏12 − 𝜏0) + 𝛽2(𝜏
∗ − 𝜏12) − 𝛾2(𝑡 − 𝜏
∗),                                𝜏∗ ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏21
𝛽1(𝜏12 − 𝜏0) + 𝛽2(𝜏
∗ − 𝜏12) − 𝛾2(𝜏21 − 𝜏
∗) − 𝛾1(𝑡 − 𝜏21), 𝜏21 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏𝑓
  
Should there more be more groups of travelers, the pattern can easily be extended. 
The toll schedule is set at a rate such that it will encourage 𝑛(𝑡) = 𝐷 for all times 𝑡0 ≤
𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑓. The same ratio of travelers will arrive early for each group as in Section 3.5, 
which simplifies finding the transition times between groups, because we need merely 
find the length of time required to discharge 
𝛾
𝛽+𝛾
 𝑁𝑖 at 𝑛𝑖(𝑡) rather than taking into 
account the effect created by an accumulated queue. The following equations describe the 





























In order to facilitate comparison between the results of Sections 3.6 and 3.7, we 
will examine the same base case laid out in Table 7. (The conditions for the order of 
travel will necessitate that the groups change their order of travel for most of the 
scenarios examined.) Figure 13 shows the schedule delay costs for travelers when the toll 
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is enacted. The dashed lines express the schedule delay costs that would be incurred by a 
traveler of group 𝑘 were they to travel at 𝑡. Obviously members of group 1 do not travel 
for the entire peak period, but we can see that the group with a lower slope travels further 
away from 𝜏∗. Figure 14 displays the toll rate at every time, 𝑡, in the system optimal toll 
scheme. Because the toll is charged to whomever travels at 𝑡, there is only a single line, 
although that line changes colors to indicate which group chooses to pay the toll rate at a 
given 𝑡. 







Figure 14: Toll rate for 2 groups in a system optimal toll scheme. 
 
Figure 15 displays the total cost profiles of each group under a system optimal 
toll. The solid line indicates the time that travelers in each group choose to depart and so 
it is clear that each group chooses to travel at points in time with equal and minimal 
costs. 




Table 9 displays the same range of sensitivity tests as Table 8.20 There are a few 
important points that should be noted. First, while 𝑇𝐶 in the toll and no-toll scenarios 
may be the same, this is not always the case. Scenarios 10-21 are cases where the total 
cost of the system changes. This can occur because the change in the order of travelers 
means that schedule delay is minimized. Thus the eventual effect on 𝑇𝐶 may not yield 
equal costs between the scenarios. The imposition of a marginal toll to eliminate queuing 
behavior can even increase total system costs. In cases 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, and 19, the 
welfare of the whole system suffers from imposing a toll. When the value of time for 
group 1 decreases relative to group 2 in case 8 the toll creates a large loss of welfare 
when they are shifted to the margin of the peak hour. In case 13, a decrease in 𝛽2 
(without a decrease in 𝛼2) relative to the base case means that group 2 would be willing 
to arrive early rather than queue, but imposition of a toll causes them to pay 225% than 
they would “pay” in time spent waiting in traffic in the no-toll scenario. 
Second, the departure order is determined by the absolute value of the schedule 
delay parameters rather than by relative worth of schedule delay. In the system optimal 
tolling scheme proposed by Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey, a traveler with 𝛼1 =
100 ₪/𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽1 = 1 ₪/𝑚𝑖𝑛 would travel in the middle of the peak period over 
another traveler with 𝛼2 = 1 ₪/𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽2 = 0.99 ₪/𝑚𝑖𝑛. This means that the departure 
order between the toll and no-toll scenarios is often flipped (as can be seen from the 
figures above). 
 
                                                 
20
 I include cases 20 and 21 for completeness (along with the enforced traveling order), but draw no 
conclusions from them since they are intended to show what happens when travelers do not behave as 
according to Wardrop’s principles in the no-toll case. 
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Table 9: Sensitivity of schedule delay, travel time, and total costs to parameters for tolled equilibrium. (Subscripts indicate 
group number.) 
No. D N1 𝛼1 𝛽1 𝛾1 N2 𝛼2 𝛽2 𝛾2 SDC SDC1 SDC2 TRC TRC1 TRC2 TC TC1 TC2 
1 6 30 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 1560.0 480.0 1080.0 1560.0 1200.0 360.0 3120.0 1680.0 1440.0 
2 4 30 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 2340.0 720.0 1620.0 2340.0 1800.0 540.0 4680.0 2520.0 2160.0 
3 8 30 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 1170.0 360.0 810.0 1170.0 900.0 270.0 2340.0 1260.0 1080.0 
4 6 30 16 5.3 21.3 30 8 4 16 1040.0 320.0 720.0 1040.0 800.0 240.0 2080.0 1120.0 960.0 
5 6 30 32 10.7 42.7 30 16 8 32 2080.0 640.0 1440.0 2080.0 1600.0 480.0 4160.0 2240.0 1920.0 
6 6 30 24 8 28 30 12 6 21 1516.7 466.7 1050.0 1516.7 1166.7 350.0 3033.3 1633.3 1400.0 
7 6 30 24 8 36 30 12 6 27 1595.5 490.9 1104.5 1595.5 1227.3 368.2 3190.9 1718.2 1472.7 
8 6 30 18 6 24 30 12 6 24 1440.0 360.0 1080.0 1440.0 1080.0 360.0 2880.0 1440.0 1440.0 
9 6 30 30 10 40 30 12 6 24 1680.0 600.0 1080.0 1680.0 1320.0 360.0 3360.0 1920.0 1440.0 
10 6 30 24 9.6 38.4 30 12 6 24 1656.0 576.0 1080.0 1656.0 1296.0 360.0 3312.0 1872.0 1440.0 
11 6 30 24 6.9 27.4 30 12 6 24 1491.4 411.4 1080.0 1491.4 1131.4 360.0 2982.9 1542.9 1440.0 
12 6 30 24 8 32 30 6 3 12 1020.0 480.0 540.0 1020.0 840.0 180.0 2040.0 1320.0 720.0 
13 6 30 24 8 32 30 18 9 36 2100.0 480.0 1620.0 2100.0 1560.0 540.0 4200.0 2040.0 2160.0 
14 6 30 24 8 32 30 12 8 32 1920.0 480.0 1440.0 1920.0 1440.0 480.0 3840.0 1920.0 1920.0 
15 6 30 24 8 32 30 12 4.8 19.2 1344.0 480.0 864.0 1344.0 1056.0 288.0 2688.0 1536.0 1152.0 
16 6 20 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 1120.0 480.0 640.0 1120.0 960.0 160.0 2240.0 1440.0 800.0 
17 6 40 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 2080.0 480.0 1600.0 2080.0 1440.0 640.0 4160.0 1920.0 2240.0 
18 6 30 24 8 32 20 12 6 24 1053.3 213.3 840.0 1053.3 693.3 360.0 2106.7 906.7 1200.0 
19 6 30 24 8 32 40 12 6 24 2173.3 853.3 1320.0 2173.3 1813.3 360.0 4346.7 2666.7 1680.0 
20 6 30 12 4 16 30 24 12 48 2400.0 240.0 2160.0 2400.0 1680.0 720.0 4800.0 1920.0 2880.0 
21 6 30 24 12 48 30 12 4 16 1440.0 720.0 720.0 1440.0 1200.0 240.0 2880.0 1920.0 960.0 
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Third, although costs as a whole decline, the costs to group 2 are almost 
uniformly higher. In cases 1-7, i.e. in the base case, as 𝐷 varies, and as the overall value 
of all traveler’s time changes, group 1 experiences a 67% decrease in 𝑆𝐷𝐶, a 150% 
increase tolls paid versus 𝑇𝑇𝐶, and a 12% decrease in 𝑇𝐶. On the other hand group 2 
travelers face a 200% increase in 𝑆𝐷𝐶, a 57% decrease in tolls paid versus 𝑇𝑇𝐶 and a 
20% increase in overall 𝑇𝐶. In fact, the only cases where group 2 has a lower cost than in 
the no-toll scenario is when the number of group 2 travelers decreases and when the 
number of group travelers increases, which indicates that as group 1 becomes a smaller 
proportion of the traveling public they may benefit from tolls. (However please note that 
as group 2 grows as a share of the traveling public, their incentive to accept a toll 
decreases since their costs rise dramatically.) 
Because travelers in different classes experience different results from the 
imposition of a tolling scheme, we ought to examine whether the scheme equitably 
allocates the welfare savings from the toll. On the one hand, the toll payment is 
horizontally equitable. Everyone faces an identical option to pay the face value of the toll 
and can choose to travel whenever they believe they will experience a minimal cost. On 
the other hand, it is clear that the welfare savings from the toll are not equally distributed 
amongst groups. When fully half the travelers face roughly 20% increases in their own 
commuting costs in order to create a 12% surplus in the welfare of the other half of 
travelers, the toll scheme effects a transfer of welfare to the richer travelers. This is an 
inequitable result. 
Fourth, even if we set aside the inequitable welfare results, there is still the further 
inequity in the way the toll changes the patterns of travel. When a toll is present, groups 
with a higher value of 𝛽 and 𝛾 will travel at the center of the peak hour regardless of the 
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relative weight of their schedule delay penalty and groups with a lower value of time will 
be shifted to the margins of the peak period. Thus, on top of having their actual costs 
increased by the toll, low-income travelers are further harmed by being made more likely 
to experience additional time poverty. Leisure time, as discussed in Section 2.4, is a 
primary social good. The opportunity to eat breakfast with one’s kids or head home to 
pick them up from soccer practice is as valuable to low-income families as high income 
families in relative terms, even though low-income families are not in a position to spend 
money in a way that reveals this preference on the toll road. 
We can see some of the inequitable time costs imposed on group 2 relative to 
group 1 by examining the change in the composition of 𝑆𝐷𝐶 when the number of 
travelers changes, i.e. who bears the burdens of additional travelers and who receives 
benefits from their reduction. What we see in cases 16-19 is that group 2 loses out on 
these terms every time. Because group 2 is shifted from the middle of the peak hour, 
where they were willing to wait because of their relatively high schedule delay penalty, 
they experience large cost increases while the cost to group 1 decreases. When the 
number of group 1 travelers increases, 𝑆𝐷𝐶 for group 1 decreases by 77% relative to the 
no-toll equilibrium but 𝑆𝐷𝐶 for group 2 increases by 344%. But when the size of group 1 
decreased, the benefits again flow in an outsized way to group 1, where 𝑆𝐷𝐶 for group 1 
decreases by 44% and 𝑆𝐷𝐶 for group 2 increases by 78%. These same patterns hold 
when the size of group 2 is changed.  
One response to this line of reasoning might be the claim that an examination of 
𝑆𝐷𝐶 has limited value and is not the proper frame of comparison. After all, 𝑆𝐷𝐶 only 
measures the cost a group faces for the disutility its member face for failing to arrive at 
𝜏∗. Perhaps a better comparison would the total cost of travel in the no-toll scenario 
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(𝑆𝐷𝐶 + 𝑇𝑇𝐶, which encompasses all of the time travelers spend) and the time cost in the 
toll scenario (𝑆𝐷𝐶). The critic may reason that the toll paid is not relevant to the time 
poverty of travelers. Two responses are in order. First, if we make this comparison we 
can see that although both mostly groups benefit from the imposition of the toll, group 1 
receives far more of the benefit than group 2. In the majority of scenarios, the overall 
time cost of group 1 decreases by 75% while group 2 decrease by 10%. Again, cases 
where the size of the two travel groups vary create overwhelming benefits for group 1 at 
the expense of group 2. Second, we should not be so quick to disregard the price of the 
toll. I have not offered a reimbursement scheme to suggest how the money collected in 
the toll scenario ought to be redistributed, but redistributing more of it to poorer travelers 
is not naturally connected goal of the system optimal toll scheme, since the only 
requirement is to decrease 𝑇𝐶. Any further distribution of welfare would be undertaken 
for independent reasons. Paying for the toll will require group 2 travelers to work hours 
whose goal is to enable the traveler to pay for their work trip in order to earn other 
money. If no toll is levied, then group 1 travelers would presumably have the option to 
not work those hours and remain just as well off as before. 
3.8: ANALYTICAL AND NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS AND DISCUSSION FOR DEPARTURE 
RATES, USER COSTS AT T FOR TWO TRAVELER CLASSES IN USER EQUILIBRIUM WITH A 
TIME EQUITABLE TOLL 
The time inequity of the system optimal tolling scheme is a feature, not a bug of 
that system. Low-income travelers, who are already more likely to experience time 
poverty, are shunted to the margins of the peak travel period in an effort to decrease the 
sum of the costs of travel for all citizens. Wealthier travelers with a higher 𝛼 experience a 
higher cost for a given level of congestion (by definition) and so efforts to decrease total 
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system costs are most effective when they focus on the large marginal effects that come 
from changing the costs facing those with the highest value of time. 
The original contribution of this thesis is the equity analysis of the system optimal 
dynamic toll and a proposal for what I will call a time-equitable tolling scheme that 
addresses these inequities. A time-equitable toll addresses the problems by meeting three 
key desiderata. 
First, the tolling scheme should preserve the same order of departures as in the 
no-toll scenario. In the no-toll case, the departure order is a reflection of the relative 
weight a group places on their schedule delay. An equitable program would show respect 
for all travelers by preserving this ordering of preferences rather than attempting to 
coerce travelers to choose times based on their absolute value of time. 
Second, a time-equitable toll rate should be a function of the difference between 






 and 𝛼1 = 𝛼2, then no subsidy 
should be provided. Our equity concern grows as the gulf between groups increases, 
because larger wealth disparities will lead to more unjust switches between groups (e.g. 
the case described in Section 3.7.)  
Third, a time-equitable toll should generate the same revenues as the system 
optimal toll. As was discussed in Chapter 1, cities and states use tolls both to ease 
congestion and to shift the burden of paying for infrastructure onto those who use it. 
Alternatives to the system optimal toll should raise at least as much money so that it does 
not shift the cost of the infrastructure back onto non-travelers. The idea of the system 
optimal toll is to make travel at the middle of the peak period affordable and fair, not to 
make it “free”. 
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Meeting these three requirements is best achieved by charging different rates to 
different travelers. Let there be 𝐾 distinct classes of travelers of size 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛𝑘which 
are characterized by differing 𝛼, 𝛽, and γ, but constrained so that 𝜂 =
𝛽𝑘
𝛾𝑘
 ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. The 










. Let 𝜖𝑛 =
𝛼𝑛
𝛽𝑛
 (note that the size of 𝜖 is less than or equal to 𝑘). 
Let there also be a toll rate escalator, 𝐸𝑆𝐶 such that 𝐸𝑆𝐶 > 1. During a length of time 
sufficient for travelers with 𝜖1 to travel (
𝛾
𝛽+𝛾
 before 𝑡∗ and 
𝛽
𝛽+𝛾
 afterwards and determined 
by the sum of all travelers in all groups with 𝜖1) the toll rate will increase by 𝛽 during the 
early period and decrease by 𝛾 for late arrivals, but during periods closer to 𝑡∗ that rate of 
increase or decrease will increase by a further factor of 𝐸𝑆𝐶.  
The tolling authority divides up the peak hour into early and late arrival periods 
corresponding to each 𝜖. For travelers in 𝜖𝑖the toll rate will increase by 𝛽𝑖 during early 
period travel up through 𝑡𝑖𝑗 and decrease by 𝛾𝑖 during late period travel after 𝑡𝑗𝑖. During 
𝑡𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑗𝑖 the toll will increase by 𝐸𝑆𝐶 ∗ 𝛽𝑖 for early travel and decrease by 𝐸𝑆𝐶 ∗ 𝛾𝑖 
for late travel. If there are two groups of travelers in 𝜖𝑖 (i.e. they have different 𝛼 & 𝛽) 
then each group will be charged a rate determined by its own schedule delay penalty. In 
the highly deterministic model described in this thesis where travelers have perfect 
knowledge of the networks costs for all travel times and insist on traveling at absolute 
minimum cost, 𝐸𝑆𝐶 can be literally any value greater than 1. Although it would be 
possible to maintain a system with no queues while not charging any toll prior to the first 
moment travelers in a group would choose travel if there were no prior travelers, the 
requirement to maintain revenues leads us to make the toll charged sensitive to the total 
number of travelers in the system. It is also more equitable to begin charging from 𝜏0 
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because this leads the toll charged to group 𝑗 to be sensitive to the size of 𝑁. If group 𝑗’s 
toll begins at 𝑡𝑖𝑗, then they will evade the costs that their travel imposes on other groups. 
The easiest way to flesh out this toll rate scheme is to return the 2 group Vickrey 






.21 Then the toll rate 








𝛽1(𝑡 − 𝜏0),                                                                                                        𝑡0 ≤  𝑡 ≤ 𝑡12 
𝛽1(𝑡12 − 𝑡0) + 𝐸𝑆𝐶 ∗ 𝛽1(𝑡 − 𝑡12),                                                                𝑡12 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡
∗
𝛽1(𝑡12 − 𝑡0) + 𝐸𝑆𝐶 ∗ (𝛽1(𝑡
∗ − 𝑡12) − 𝛾1(𝑡 − 𝑡
∗)),                                  𝑡∗ ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡21
𝛽1(𝑡12 − 𝑡0) + 𝐸𝑆𝐶 ∗ (𝛽1(𝑡
∗ − 𝑡12) − 𝛾1(𝑡21 − 𝑡




𝛽2(𝑡 − 𝜏0),                                                                                                           𝑡0 ≤  𝑡 ≤ 𝑡12
𝛽2(𝑡
∗ − 𝑡0) − 𝛾2(𝑡 − 𝑡21),                                                                                𝑡21 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑓
 
The cost to group 2 is the same as if all travelers in the peak period had the same 
preferences as group 2, which means that they don’t receive a “free lunch” as they would 
if their toll were set to 0 until the start of their travel period. The goal of the time 
equitable toll is not to absolutely minimize traveler costs, but instead to ensure that they 
are reasonable while preserving a departure order determined by travelers’ relative cost of 
schedule delay. 
Figure 16, Figure 17, and Figure 18 display the schedule delay, toll rate, and total 
cost profiles, respectively, for the time-equitable tolling pattern. Travelers in group 2 pay 
a cost equal to the cost they would bear if all 𝑁 travelers possessed the same traits and 
preferences as themselves. This ensures that they pay their fair share for the congestion 
                                                 
21
 We choose this relationship in order to demonstrate the effect of travelers changing their order. If traveler 
preferences are differently ordered then the time equity issues central to this thesis are not encountered. 
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that they might cause while not being priced out of the ability to travel in the middle of 
the peak period. 
Figure 16: Schedule delay cost profile for 2 groups in a time-equitable tolling scheme. 
 




Setting a continuously increasing toll for group 2 from 𝜏0 raises their costs as can 
be seen from Figure 17. If we decided to substantially increase the subsidy to group 2 
travelers we could do so by dropping their toll to zero outside of 𝜏12 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏21though the 
third condition on an acceptable alternative to the system optimal toll does not permit 
such a subsidy. Figure 18 would then show a decreasing cost function for group 2 during 
the period they do not travel rather than the constant function in the time-equitable toll 
policy I have proposed. 
Figure 18: Total cost profile for 2 groups in a time-equitable tolling scheme. 
 
We will now discuss the time-equitable tolling scheme in relation to both the no-
toll and the queue eliminating toll proposed by Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey. The 
results of the time-equitable tolling model are found in Table 10. The first result that must 
be acknowledged is that the time-equitable toll always increases the total welfare cost 
relative to the no-toll scheme, although the effect is slight. The maximum increase in cost 
is 14% (case 14) comes when 𝛽2 rises relative to 𝛼2 because tolls depend on 𝛽 while 𝑇𝑇𝐶 
depends upon 𝛼. Nonetheless, the effect on net social welfare is not large.  
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The second point to note is that 𝑆𝐷𝐶 stays constant between the no-toll and time-
equitable toll, which occurs because the travelers maintain their order of departure. This 
means that any change in the aggregate welfare of the scenario comes from the difference 
in the travel time cost and monetary cost of the toll. Third, note that the cost to group 1 
stays constant between the no-toll and time-equitable tolls. 𝑆𝐷𝐶1 is the same for all cases 
between the two schemes and 𝑇𝑇𝐶 = 𝑇𝑅𝐶. Thus, increases in 𝑇𝐶 come from increases in 
𝑇𝐶2, which are driven by the higher cost of tolls relative to travel time, i.e. 𝑇𝑅𝐶2 − 𝑇𝑇𝐶2. 
The result is that, relative to the no-toll scenario all additional costs are borne by group 2, 
but on the other hand group 1 does not benefit in its total welfare by the imposition of the 
toll as occurs with the system optimal toll. 
This uneven bearing of the costs of the toll does raise an equity concern. After all, 
if the point of the time-equitable toll is to be equitable, then a toll that eliminates 
congestion by charging low-income travelers more than they believe their time waiting in 
traffic is worth while substituting the cost of queuing for high income travelers with a toll 
is certainly suspicious. However, there are two ways in which the proposed tolling 
scheme is more equitable as becomes apparent when we compare the outcomes of the 
queue eliminating toll and the time-equitable toll.22  
 
                                                 
22
 Note that the toll is being proposed on the supposition that eliminating congestion is a worthwhile goal. 
This is eminently reasonable. 𝑇𝑇𝐶 is a complete social loss, while 𝑇𝑅𝐶 represents money that can be spent 
on other goods, even subsidizing group 2 as a class. The time-equitable toll is also being proposed on the 
further supposition that the no-toll scenario is the proper reference point for our analysis. Any proposal 
where we define equity as the preservation of the distribution of welfare through a change in the system 
(e.g. using a toll to eliminate congestion) will necessarily hinge a great deal on whatever we define as the 
starting point. In this case I believe beginning with the welfare distribution found in the no-toll scheme is 
appropriate. In particular, it is an appropriate starting point because the no-toll scheme sorts travelers by 
their relative desire to arrive on time. All travelers are shown equal respect in that, if they wish to arrive at 
𝜏∗ they are all equally able to use their time for that purpose.  
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Table 10: Sensitivity of schedule delay, travel time, and total costs to parameters for time-equity equilibrium. (Subscripts 
indicate group number.) 
No. D N1 𝛼1 𝛽1 𝛾1 N2 𝛼2 𝛽2 𝛾2 SDC SDC1 SDC2 TRC TRC1 TRC2 TC TC1 TC2 
1 6 30 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 1800.0 1440.0 360.0 1560.0 480.0 1080.0 3360.0 1920.0 1440.0 
2 4 30 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 2700.0 2160.0 540.0 2340.0 720.0 1620.0 5040.0 2880.0 2160.0 
3 8 30 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 1350.0 1080.0 270.0 1170.0 360.0 810.0 2520.0 1440.0 1080.0 
4 6 30 16 5.3 21.3 30 8 4 16 1200.0 960.0 240.0 1040.0 320.0 720.0 2240.0 1280.0 960.0 
5 6 30 32 10.7 42.7 30 16 8 32 2400.0 1920.0 480.0 2080.0 640.0 1440.0 4480.0 2560.0 1920.0 
6 6 30 24 8 28 30 12 6 21 1750.0 1400.0 350.0 1516.7 466.7 1050.0 3266.7 1866.7 1400.0 
7 6 30 24 8 36 30 12 6 27 1840.9 1472.7 368.2 1595.5 490.9 1104.5 3436.4 1963.6 1472.7 
8 6 30 18 6 24 30 12 6 24 1440 1080 360 1440 360 1080 2880 1440 1440 
9 6 30 30 10 40 30 12 6 24 2160 1800 360 1680 600 1080 3840 2400 1440 
10 6 30 24 9.6 38.4 30 12 6 24 2088.0 1728.0 360.0 1656.0 576.0 1080.0 3744.0 2304.0 1440.0 
11 6 30 24 6.9 27.4 30 12 6 24 1594.3 1234.3 360.0 1491.4 411.4 1080.0 3085.7 1645.7 1440.0 
12 6 30 24 8 32 30 6 3 12 1620 1440 180 1020 480 540 2640 1920 720 
13 6 30 24 8 32 30 18 9 36 1980 1440 540 2100 480 1620 4080 1920 2160 
14 6 30 24 8 32 30 12 8 32 1920.0 1440.0 480.0 1920.0 480.0 1440.0 3840.0 1920.0 1920.0 
15 6 30 24 8 32 30 12 4.8 19.2 1728.0 1440.0 288.0 1344.0 480.0 864.0 3072.0 1920.0 1152.0 
16 6 20 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 1213.3 853.3 360.0 1053.3 213.3 840.0 2266.7 1066.7 1200.0 
17 6 40 24 8 32 30 12 6 24 2493.3 2133.3 360.0 2173.3 853.3 1320.0 4666.7 2986.7 1680.0 
18 6 30 24 8 32 20 12 6 24 1280.0 1120.0 160.0 1120.0 480.0 640.0 2400.0 1600.0 800.0 
19 6 30 24 8 32 40 12 6 24 2400.0 1760.0 640.0 2080.0 480.0 1600.0 4480.0 2240.0 2240.0 
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First, the time-equitable toll is a more equitable distribution of 𝑇𝐶 than the system 
optimal toll. Take the base case. In both the system optimal and time-equitable tolls 
group 2 experiences a 20% increase in 𝐶2 , but in the system optimal toll all of this 
welfare is transferred to group 1 (which results in a net wash of 𝑇𝐶). Although group 2 
experiences higher costs, they are not compelled to transfer their costs into a benefit for 
other travelers. Should group 2 travelers decide that they do not have the funds to pay a 
toll in the center of the peak hour, they always have the option to forego the time benefits 
by choosing to travel outside of their group’s time slot since their costs are flat over the 
entire peak hour. If this happened in significant numbers a real system may not be able to 
maintain the no-queue requirement, but such as a case would also mean that the estimates 
of 𝛼2, 𝛽2, and 𝛾2 were improperly calibrated. 
Second, the time-equitable toll provides group 2 with a benefit by decreasing 
𝑆𝐷𝐶2 while eliminating congestion. The time-equitable toll preserves the correct order of 
departures by tying departure patterns to a relative desire to arrive on time. For all 
scenarios where the 𝑁 = 60, 𝑆𝐷𝐶2 decreases by 67% relative to the system optimal toll. 
The time-equitable toll thus decreases the incidence of time poverty amongst group 2 
travelers. We have eliminated the wasted 𝑇𝑇𝐶 for all travelers and passed that time 
savings on to all travelers but particularly to those who value it most relative to their 




Chapter 4: Conclusion 
The true costs of travel are always paid. Individual travelers may pay their cost by 
arriving early or late, by waiting in traffic, or by paying a toll. And they may end up 
paying queuing costs created by other travelers who have externalized their own cost of 
travel. The road itself may either be paid through user fees or through area wide taxes 
insensitive to travel behavior. Dynamic tolling schemes offer a way to pay for 
infrastructure while eliminating the deadweight loss of travel time costs. System optimal 
tolls have been widely proposed as a panacea to the ills of modern day travel because 
they minimize the cost of all travel over the network.  
In this thesis I argue that system optimal tolls present two distinct equity 
concerns. First, they achieve their efficient outcome by shifting a greater percentage of 
system costs to low income travelers. Reducing travel costs facing high income travelers 
generates the largest marginal decrease in travel costs, so policy makers get the biggest 
bang for their buck by decreasing the costs of these travelers, even if that harms low 
income travelers. Second, system optimal tolls are likely to increase time poverty among 
low income travelers. System optimal tolls order traveler departures on the absolute value 
of traveler time rather than the relative value of schedule delay to travel time delay costs 
that orders no-toll equilibria. Combine this with the fact that low income families require 
extensive amounts of “free time” in order to perform household chores and meet basic 
needs that wealthier families are able to accomplish using money. The result is that 
structuring traveler departures so that low income travelers depart at the margins of the 




In order to prove that system optimal tolls raise equity concerns, I present a 
theoretical foundation to argue that equitable policies transportation policies are ones that 
show sufficient respect to all travelers, argue that the dual disproportionate burdens of 
system optimal tolls fail to show sufficient respect to low income travelers, and conclude 
by proposing a time-equitable tolling scheme that ameliorates the time poverty problems 
and some of the welfare inequities of a system optimal toll. The definition that equitable 
policies show sufficient respect for travelers helps to explain the three different, 
sometimes exclusive, conceptions of equity deployed in the literature. Horizontal equity 
ought to be applied when travelers have equal status, bear roughly equal costs, and 
receive roughly equal benefits from a policy. Vertically equitable policies are required 
when the stakes are higher and the costs and benefits are distributed unequally even if all 
travelers are subject to the same rules and opportunities. 
I contend that the burdens of time poverty are the precisely the kinds of costs that 
require special concern for low income travelers. The time equitable toll treats all 
travelers with sufficient respect by ordering departures in a way that respects the relative 
weight that groups place on their schedule delay costs, is sensitive to the gap in resources 
between different traveling groups, and generates the same amount of revenue as the 
system optimal toll. 
Big data raises the likelihood that toll road companies will be able to target 
travelers according to their value of time and schedule delay costs. They are likely to 
adopt either profit maximizing algorithms or (if pushed by political pressure) system 
optimal tolls. Any tolling scheme will have manifold effects on travelers and it is 
important that we begin to have a discussion of these effects before they happen. This 
thesis is written in the hopes of being a catalyst for such a discussion on toll schemes, 
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equity, and time poverty within transportation policy. Although the literature has 
discussed all three of these issues and even brought some of them together, there has to 
this point been no sustained discussion of how transportation policies can exacerbate or 
ameliorate inequitable distributions of time poverty. By adopting a straightforward model 
with a limited number of parameters, I attempt to raise these questions and to keep equity 
at the forefront of the model. I hope to continue this work by pursuing three distinct, but 
interdependent, strains of research.  
First, I believe future work to more fully explore complex Vickrey bottleneck 
models is warranted. Introducing networks with alternate paths, networks with multiple 
destinations, travelers who desire to arrive throughout the peak hour, and travelers who 
can choose not travel to the basic Vickrey model considered in this thesis will provide 
fruitful material to future discussions of tolls and equity. It will be particularly important 
that these wrinkles to the model do not lead us to lose sight of the fact that we must be 
concerned with the inequitable distribution of the costs of time poverty and social welfare 
that system optimal tolls can create. To this end, the second piece of future research 
engendered by this thesis will be a thorough investigation into empirical estimations of 
time poverty parameters. Travelers with high relative schedule delay penalties experience 
real costs when their financial means do not permit them to travel in the middle of the 
peak hour. Low income parents who struggle to manage their schedule in order to pick 
their children up from school and then to cook meals from scratch are not abstract victims 
of toll schemes that price them out of the market. We should not pretend that they are. 
However, a great deal of work remains to be done to quantify these effects and place 
them in a context that policy makers will understand and appreciate.  
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The final step of this research program is to bring together real world 
implementations of dynamic tolls with the equity analysis proposed in this thesis. The 
real world is messy. Real cities have hundreds of thousands of travelers who all have 
hundreds of variables, most of which are unobservable, affecting their decision to travel 
and this greatly complicates the problem of determining how tolls should be priced in 
order to equitably minimize congestion. An important piece of this puzzle, however, is to 
dive into the details of actual traveler decisions. This was a project too sprawling for a 
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